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Since 1S48 a stalemate has existed between North and
South Korea on the issue of unification. Although discus-
sions were held on the subject in 1972 and 1979 f no substan-
tive changes have occurred in the situation for 35 years.
Thus, new approaches that could increase the possibility of
agreement between North and Scuth Korea must be developed.
This thesis uses a game theoretical model based on the
Prisoner's Dilemma tc analyze the situation and provide
strategy recommendations that can help alter the status quo.
This theoretical model will provide policymakers with an
insight intc the problems involved in moving towards unifi-
cation. The role that the U.S., Japan, USSR, and the PRC
have in the unification process is also analyzed using the
game theoretical model. It concludes that: the time tc act
is now, the initiative for unification must come from inside
Korea, and that a substantive increase in communication and
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Solving the unification problem of North and South Korea
is one of the most perplexing issues in Northeast Asia. For
the past thirty years this problem has proven to be insur-
mountable. The unification of North and South Korea
involves much more than the disagreement between these two
countries. The ccifrontaticn also involves four great
powers of the world: the United States, Japan, the People's
Republic of China, and the Soviet Union. Geographically,
this confrontation cccurs in the backyard of three cf the
four major powers. For all four powers it is where major
national interests converge. The array of formal and
informal alliances between these four powers and the two
Koreas further complicates the problem. This situation is
extremely sensitive and volatile. Due to the sensitive
nature of the situation a complete understanding of the
unification issue is a requirement for all policy makers
involved. Thus, all available means that clearly outline,
define, and explain the problem should be brought tc the
attention of the governments involved. This is necessary
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for two reasons. First, to understand the situation, ail
its complexities, and the factors that affect the strategies
of the nations involved; second, to see what the available
range of choices are upon which unification can be based.
The unification problem reguires the close attention cf all
the nations involved. This attention is necessary if a
peaceful solution is to be reached and a conflict on the
peninsula avoided.
This thesis attempts to use game theory and bargaining
theory to analyze the unification issue in Korea. It will
examine the nature of the dilemma in which the two Koreas
are caught, the strategies employed by both sides in the
situation, and the process of bargaining as a means of
producing a mutually beneficial solution for both Koreas.
Game theory will provide a better understanding of the situ-
ation as it has developed and as it exists today. A more
thorough understanding of the situation will aid policy-
makers in that: better policy choices can be made with a
clearer understanding of the situation and, this knowledge
can help provide a better environment within which
bargaining can take place.
Bargaining theory provides a means of analyzing the
prospects for agreement. But it cannot be separated from
game theory. Bather, bargaining theory must be treated as
an integral element cf more general game theoretical models.
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Bargaining theory can be used as an aid in developing agree-
ments between opposing parties. Some conflict situations
are relatively simple in nature. These will have at issue
cne or at most a very few points of contention. The solu-
tion to such a situation may be a simple yes or no.
However; as conflict situations increase in complexity, the
number cf pcints of disagreement will increase. Such is the
case in Korea on the unification issue. A simple yes cr no
by both sides may seem to provide a solution to the problem.
However/ the underlying problems involved in the integration
of the two countries actually make for an array of problems
that need to be solved. This is not necessarily bad. As
the size of the problem increases, the number of possible
solutions also increases.
There is in fact an infinite number of agreements that
lie between the status quo and full unification. It is
therefore net necessary to move directly from the status quo
to full unification. If it were a simple thing tc dc one
would really have to question the motives of the two
governments involved for not already solving the problem.
It is in fact a highly complicated situation that is frcught
with deviation, misconception, and mistrust. Given a better
understanding of the situation it is possible through
bargaining to begin to move away from the status quo to a
point where both North and South Korea will be better off.
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Conversely, in moving from the status guo it is possible to
reduce the tension that currently exists between these two
countries.
The tasic model developed in this study is a Prisoner's
Dilemma model, which is a two-person non zero sum game. The
structure of this type game closely resembles the current
situation in Korea en the unification issue. The non-
cooperative form of the game is explained first. It is
non-ccoperative because of the lack of communication and
cooperation that has existed between the two countries. The
game in the non-cooperative form displays the reasons why
the situation has continued to exist since the end cf World
War II. The non-cooperative game exists due to the lack of
any overt communication between the two players. This has
certainly been the case in Korea. The lack of communication
has prevented any move toward a solution of the unification
issue
.
The next step is to show how the existing situation can
be modified so that the two Koreas can move from a non-
cooperative game to a cooperative type of non zero-sum game.
In the cooperative game communication between the players
can occur and thus bargaining becomes an important issue in
resolving the conflict.
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Once involved in a bargaining situation it is possible
to find a solution that satisfies both parties. This solu-
tion can be defined in temporary or permanent terms. If
temporary, it becomes a small portion of what could te an
ever increasing set cf solutions. This growing number of
small agreements could eventually lead to the outcome that
would test benefit bcth sides. An example of this is the 20
Pilot Projects proposed by the Republic of Korea on February
7, 1S82. If the South and the North were to agree that
total unification was the ultimate solution that provided
the greatest benefits for both sides, then the process of a
set of smaller agreements on lesser issues could conceivably
lead to unification, or as a minimum to the reduction of
tension tetw.een the two Koreas. This may be a necessary
first step in a long process.
A permanent solution is one in which the goals of both
the South and the North are met at the conclusion of the
intitial bargaining encounter. This is extremely unlikely
given the divergence of the possible solutions offered by
each side, and the history of non-cooperation by both sides
on this issue. Thus, the case in which a set of smaller
solutions might lead to the ultimate settlement of the
dispute is seen to have the most credence. This assumes, of
course, that no catastrophic event such as war occurs that
would provide an immediate solution to the problem.
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Eargaining as the means of arriving at the outcome that
best satisfies the needs of both sides becomes the central
factor in the resolution of this conflict. In light of the
fact that little has happened in Korea in this area, a new
approach to the bargaining process is necessary. Roger
Fisher and William Ury, from the Harvard Negotiation
Project, have developed some novel approaches to the
bargaining process. Their ideas of "principled negotiaticn"
can he applied to the process of unifying Korea [1].
The models that are developed can be applied not only to
total unification but also to lesser forms of conflict reso-
lution in Korea. Thus, even if total unification were never
to occur these models are applicable to other areas such as:
tension and arms reduction, some form of intermediate or
partial unification, cr even the formalization of the status
quo by all parties involved in the situation.*
E. DEFINING UNIFICATION
Prior to developing and utilizing the theoretical model
it is important to define what is meant by unification.
Unification of two countries falls into what is known as
integration theory by political scientists. A number of
Application of the models to these other areas will be
developed further in the last chapter.
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theories have been developed as to how and why integration
occurs [2]. Integration of two countries can occur at many
levels socially, economically and politically. However,
social and economic integration of two countries is accom-
plished more easily than political integration. This is
true because, of the three areas, only political integration
requires a large treasure of identification with the
Community as a whole £3 ]. This is especially true in Korea
given the diametrically opposed political systems of South
and North Korea.
Ernst Haas defines integration as a process "whereby
political actors in several distinct national settings are
persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations, and polit-
ical activities toward a new center, whose institutions
possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing
national states" [4]. Leon Lindberg, also writing on the
European Community, defines integration as "the process
whereby nations forge the desire and ability to conduct
foreign and key doaestic policies independently of each
ether, seeking instead to make joint decisions, or to dele-
gate the decision- making process to new central organs" [5].
Amatai Etzioni has established a paradigm for political
integration [6]- In referring to political integration he
defines the end product of the unification process as a
"political community".
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A political community is a community that posseses three
kinds of integraticc: (a) it has an effective central
over the use of the means of violence; (b) it has a
center of decision-making that is able to affect signif-
icantly the allocation of resources and rewards
throughout the community; and (c) it is the dominant
focus cf political identification for the large majority
of politically aware citizens. [7]
Total integration and thus unification can only occur when
this political community is formed.
Harold Hakwan Sunoo discusses this fact in his book
Amer icals D ile mma in Asia ^8], He argues that political
integration involves a move to the political center by both
sides. This is difficult to accomplish since it "closely
touches the problem cf citizen's loyalty" [9]. One school
cf thought argues that the best way to achieve political
integration is to start the process by focusing on limited
functional areas such as economics and welfare [10].
Success at these tasks can then facilitate a gradual
transfer of loyalties to the broader political unit. While
this is true for complete unification it does not fellow
that the unification process must happen all at one time
[11]-
In order to build a workable model the statements and
proposals made by North and South Korea must be taken liter-
ally. This is to say that both governments are sincere in
their statements and proposals and that they truly desire to
17
unify' the country. It is possible that the twc Korean
governments do not stand behind their rhetoric and propo-
sals. Therefore they may have other reasons for making
their proposals on the unification issue such as sustaining
their political regime in power. Or, as Gavan McCormack
asserts, "that proposals by either side are not necessarily
serious-they may well be offered simply to give the appear-
ance (to cne*s own side, to the other side, or to world
opinion generally) of flexibility, and concern to seek a
just and fair solution, and offered in full awareness that
the proposal will be unacceptable" [12]. The unification
issue in this situation becomes the basis for the legitimacy
of the two governments. While both countries have differing
plans as to how this integration should take place, they
toth agree that the ultimate solution is total and complete
social, economic, political, and geographic integration.
Total integration in all four of these areas then becomes
the definition of unification on which the models will be
tased
.
In taking the twc Koreas statements and proposals liter-
ally, there are three assumptions that must be made. First,
both North and South Korea are in fact saying what they
mean. This implies government support for their announced
unification policies. Second, both are striving continu-
ously towards their ultimate goal of complete unification of
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their country. Third, that there are in fact mutual inter-
ests in unification that are recognized by fcoth sides.
As a point of departure, the current proposals for the
unification process as seen by the South and the North are
presented. Their methods for acheiving unification differ
greatly. Since they are so different, they have contributed
to the lack of any meaningful dialogue between the North and
the South on unification. 3y sticking solidly to these
positions, North and South Korea have been unable to affect
an agreeirent. Roger Fisher and William Ury refer to this as
"bargaining over positions". This "fails to meet the basic
criteria of producing a wise agreement, efficiently, and
amicably" [ 13]-
The DFEK proposal, given by Kim II Sung at the Sixth
Congress of the Korean Worker's Party in October 1981, is
shown in Figure 1.1 £14]. The plan involves first estab-
lishing a Supreme National Confederal Assembly with equal
representation from the North, the South, and overseas-
Koreans. A Confederal Standing Committee (CSC) would guide
both regional governments and administer all affairs of the
confederal state. The DPRK plan calls for the new country
to be neutral and ncn-aligned with no affiliations to any
political or military alliance or bloc. North Korea has
established several pre-conditions for the establishment of
this confederal state to which the South must agree. They
are;
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Supreme National Confederal Assembly
(equal North and Soutn representation and
and appropriate number of representatives









areas of mutual concern




(number is unknown. CSC will take over
when the SNCA above is not in session)




(integration of North and
South forces)
Two autonomous regional governments
South Korea
FUNCTIONS
1. to follow an independent
policy within the limits
consistent with the interests
of the whcle nation
North Korea
2. to achieve a uniform development
of the country and the nation
Source: Tae-hwan Kwak, "Problems of Korean Political
Integration", p. 24.
Figure 1.1 DPHK Unification Formula
20
1. the elimination of fascist rule in the South/
2. the repeal of anti-communist confrontation policy,
3. the repeal of the National Security Law,
4. the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea,
5. release of political prisoners including communists.
Figure 1.2 shows the RCK plan for unification. This
plan involves initial cooperation at a lower, non govern-
mental level that would eventually lead to a unification of
the two governments. This plan was proposed by President
Chun Eoo Hwan on January 22, 1982. The first step would be
the establishment of a Consultative Council for National
Beunif ication. It would be composed of delegates from both
the North and the South. The purpose of this Conference
would be to draft a Constitution designed to establish a
unified democratic Korea. When completed the Constitution
would be made law by a referendum held throughout Korea.
The South proposed several interim measures that would
be contained in an agreement on relations between the North
and the South during the period prior to the establishment
of the unified state. They are:
1. relations between the North and the South should be
based on the principle of equality and reciprocity
pending unification,
2. both countries should abandon all forms of military
force and violence, as well as the threat to use such
21
A preparatory conference for .the necessary
procedures for a North-South meeting
I
Summit meeting between the highest
authorities of the North and South
I
Conclusion of a Provisional Agreement on relations between
North and South Korea (7 Interim measures of national recon
ciliaticn for National reunification)
Formation of a Consultative Conference for National unification
I
Drafting of a Constitution- name, basic policy,
forms of government, national elections decided
I
Approval of a unified Constitution through referendum
I
Free general election by unified Constitution of a
legislature and a unified Eepublic government
I
A unified Democratic Republic- ideals of national
integration, democracy, liberty and individual well being
Source: Tae-hwan Kwak "Problems of Korean Political
Integration" p. 26.
Figure 1.2 ROK Unification Plan.
force, and try for peaceful solutions to all problems
through negotiation,
3. both countries should recognize the other's existing
political order and institutions and should not
interfere in the other's internal affairs,
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4. toth sides should maintain the regime of the armi-
stice in force while working to end the arms race an
i
military confrontation,
5. toth sides should open their society to the ether;
for free travel and promoting exchange and coopera-
tion,
6. toth sides should respect the other's bi-lateral and
multi-lateral treaties and agreements,
7. toth sides should appoint a plenipotentiary envoy
with the rank cf cabinet minister to head a resident
liason mission to be established in both' Seoul and
Pyongyang.
These two formulas for resolving the conflict are indeed
miles apart. However, there are some mutual interests that
can be identified. The main difference is not in the fact
that the ultimate interests are different, but on the
vehicle necessary to achieve those interests. Since there
are seme mutual interests, it becomes important in resolving
the basic conflict to (1) highlight those interests; and (2)
to understand the complete range of factors that affect the
process of achieving those interests. One tool available
that can do these two things and thus can be useful in
resolving the conflict is game theory.
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C. BEIEVANCE OF GAHI THEORY
Martin Shubik, a leading game theorist, defines jame
theory this way:
Game theory is a method for the study of decision making
in situations of conflict. It deals with human
processes in which the individual decision unit is not
in complete control of ether decision units entering
into the environment. It is addressed to problems
involving conflict, cooperation, or both, at many
levels. The decision unit may be an individual, a
group, a formal or an informal organization, or a
society. The stage may be set to reflect primarily
political, psychological, sociological, economic, or
other aspects of human affairs. The essence of a game
in this context is that it involves decision makers with
different goals or objectives whose fates are
intertwined. £ 15 ]
The analysis of games will not furnish a normative code
of hew to behave ethically in any concrete situation, nor
does it give us a complete empirical theory of how people
actually do behave in real- life situations. Hence, we do
not expect from game theory a reliable predictive capability
in international politics. However, the general concensus
among game theorists is that, when used correctly, game
theoretical models can aid us in understanding and resolving
conflicts. In the words of Anatol Eapoport, "the achievment
of game theory, then, is that it relates precise concepts to
conflict resolution that have hitherto had only an intuitive
meaning or rather different meanings for different people in
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different contexts" £16]- Thus, it is assumed, that a
tetter understanding of the conflict situation will te an
invaluable aid in resolving the conflict. This is true
since all players will be utilizing the "same sheet of
music" from which to flay. With all the positive aspects to
be gained in applying game theory to international relations
it must not be assumed that there are no deficiencies.
However, even after its deficiencies and limitations are
recognized, game theory remains a useful analytical tool
[17]. More specifically the rational approach to game
theory can te useful in the following areas:*
1. For conceptual clarification of how to define
rational behavior in various social situations,
2. for explanation of people's behavior (in cases which
their behavior exhibit high degrees of rationality
and therefore admits an explanation in terms of a
rationalistic theory)
3. for providing heuristic criteria for explanatory and
predictive theories of social behavior,
4. for providing a descriptive standard by which to
judge the rationality of people's behavior,
*Eationality as applied to the model in this study is
defined in Chapter 3.
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5. fcr providing rational strategy recommendations for
the various participants. £18]
This thesis will highlight and expand on the second and
fifth points above. Game theory will be used first to
understand the existing situation. It will be a tool by
which toth observers of and participants in the unification
issue can gain a better understanding of:
1. the structure of the game and thus the conflict,
2. the ordinal preferences among a range of several
outcomes for both players,
3. the role the payoff structure of the possitle
outcomes plays,
4. the risks involved in choosing one outcome over
another or in moving from one outcome to another,
5. how the payoffs of each outcome affect players
choices,
6. what can be done to move towards a solution of the
dilemma,
7. what external factors can affect the game's struc-
ture ( outcomes, risks, and payoffs),
8. hew any features of the situation concealed fcy rhet-
oric may be exposed,
9. how perceptions of the situation by the players might
be changed given the clearer understanding of the
situation as outlined by game theory.
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Knowing the range of available options and the effects of
choosing one of those options is a key element in solving
the problem.
Secondly, specific strategy recommendations can be made
as to how the two players can resolve the conflict. These
will be tased on a set of rational choices derived from the
study of the model. They can be developed in two ways.
First, there are game theoretical solutions to Prisoner's
Dilemma that have been provided by leading game theorists.
These solutions can cnly be taken in an abstract sense since
the studies of Prisoner's Dilemma were done in controlled,
highly mathematical situations in the laboratory. The use
of these solutions in international relations is merely an
extrapclaticn of the conclusions gleaned from the results
obtained in the laboratory. In the "real world" of interna-
tional conflict these solutions may or may not work in a
given situation. They would be subject to influences that
cannot be readily guantified in the laboratory such as; the
national will to act in a given situation, the bargaining
style of the opponents, and the internal political pressures
placed on the governments in trying to negotiate a solution
to the dilemma. Therefore, general concepts as tc the
strategies to be employed are the most important element to
be gained from these laboratory situations, and the hasis
for the reccmmendaticns in this thesis.
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Second, there are historical studies of actual conflict
situations that can re described in terms of game theoret-
ical models. The best one by far is by Glenn H. Snyder and
Paul Diesing Conflict Amon g Na t i ons : Bargaining/ Dec isio n
MiSi.2.9' §5^ Sy_stem St ruct ure in International Crises [19].
In their study of twelve Twentieth century conflicts they
examined hew solutions were obtained. They placed the
conflict in a game theoretical context, by type of game, and
determined the elements that resolved the situation. This
was done from the aspect of the bargaining and decision
making that took place on both sides of the conflict.
The Xey element in solving the dilemma is bargaining.
While Snyder and Diesing describe the elements of bargaining
that were necessary to solve conflicts that have occurred,
they do not discuss hew to bargain. For the purpose of this
study, a more practically oriented approach to bargaining is
necessary. Such an approach is provided by Roger Fisher and
William Ury and is discussed in chapter 7.
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The issue of unification is vitally important to both
North and South Korea. It has been at the forefront of
their foreign policies since the establishment of their
respective governments. Until recently, much of their diplo-
matic activity around the globe was to elicit support for
their respective side on this issue. It was felt that this
would lend a certain amount of legitimacy to their
bargaining position. To understand the current situation in
Korea on the unification issue one must have some knowledge
of the historical course of events as played by both sides
since the end of the Second World War. This period can be
divided into seven phases.*
A. 1945-1950
With the Cairo Conference in 1943 Roosevelt, Churchill,
and Chiang Kai-shek declared that upon the defeat of the
Japanese, "the three great powers are determined that in due
course, Korea shall be free and independent". However, by
*A more detailed chronology of these events is in Appendix
A.
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the time of the Yalta Conference it was apparent Soviet
interests in Asia would have to Joe accomodated. With the
fall of the Japanese the US decided to allow the parti-
tioning cf Korea at the 38th parallel. US interests at that
time lay mere in Japan, and it was felt that the 38th
parallel was as far as the US could secure in Korea, given
the deactivation of much of its armed forces. While the US
was engaged in occupying Japan and dissolving the Japanese
armed forces, the Soviet Unicn began in 1945 to move into
the northern half of Korea and occupied it with a large
contingent cf its armed forces. The United States and the
Soviet Union held talks in May and October 1946 to discuss
ways cf unifying Korea. These discussions did not solve any
of the tasic differences between the two sides and were
suspended indefinitely.
The Soviets established Kim II Sung as the leader in the
North. In his first statement as Premier of the DPRK, in
September 1S48, he proclaimed unification to be the top
priority of his government [20]. The United States, on the
ether hand, in 1947 turned the unification issue over to the
United Nations. The UN called for general elections to be
held in all of Korea to determine a national leader. The
EPRK refused to have elections in the North so the elections
were held only in the South. From this election cam€ the
rise of the Republic of Korea in 1948. With the Soviets
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firmly ertrenched in the North/ and the US and UN bacXing
the government in the South, the die was cast for the
continued division of Korea. In the late 1940' s this situ-
ation was exacerbated by the decline of relations between
the US and USSR/ and the Korean War.
B. 1950-1953
With the coming cf the Korean War in June 1950, it
became apparent that both the North and the South were
seeking a military urification. At different points in the
War both sides came close to achieving this goal. None of
the major powers involved; PRC, USSR, US, pushed for a final
military solution to the problem of a divided Korea for fear
of it growing into a new World War. This sentiment on the
part of the major pcwers continues today and is one of the
reasons that another try at military unification has not
occurred [21]. The signing of the Armistice in 1953 did not
settle the unification issue. The terms of the Armistice
were to be temcrary pending the conclusion of a lasting
peace £22]. A peace treaty has not been signed and the
terms of the Armistice still stand. This is another impedi-
ment to unification. The ROK was not a signatory of the
Armistice. Consequently the DPRK feels they should net be
included in any discussions concerning a permanent peace
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treaty. This was amended in an offer made by North Korea in
January 1984 that proposed talks with botn the 'Jnited States
and the Republic of Korea on the unification issue.
C. 1953-1961
The failure of a military solution to the unification
issue brought in a era of a mutual standoff. The Southern
regime of Syngman Bhee maintained a formal posture of
"pukchin" ("Northward march") to reunite the country, but
took no concrete steps £23]. With his country in ruins and
as a result of his try at military unification, Kim II Sung
began his guest for a peaceful solution to unification. In
his report to the Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee of
the Korean Worker's Party on August 5, 1953, Kim described
the significance of the Armistice as the first step toward
the peaceful solution of the Korean question and the first
example of a contribution toward the easing of international
tensions [ 24 ].
The Geneva Conference on Korea held in June 1954 failed
to settle the unification issue. The Conference was
attended by the ROK and its 16 allies on one side and by the
EPRK, the USSR and the PRC on the other. The discussions
broke down over three issues that were favored by the South
and firmly rejected by the North: (1) the authority and
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competence cf the United Nations on the Korean question,
(2) United Nations supervised elections proportionate to the
population cf the whcle of Korea, (3) and the stationing of
United Nations forces in Korea until the creation of a
unified, independent, and democratic Korea. [25]
Cn the other hand, the US and the South refused to give
up any freedoms that were alive in the South as a result of
the War. In December 1954 the United Nations General
Assembly, after the failure of the Geneva Conference,
reaffirmed its goal of a unified, independent, and demo-
cratic Korea that would be established by peaceful means.
This was the beginning of the annual United Nations debates
on the Korean division that would prove to be of no avail.
In 1956 and 1957 Kim proposed that international confer-
ences cn Korea be held. The purpose of these conferences
was: to guarantee peace in Korea, to achieve a North-South
agreement net to use military force, and the withdrawal of
all foreign troops £26]. During this period the North tegan
a series of economic development plans. Chinese troops were
withdrawn from Korea in 1957. In the South, Syngman Rhee
was unable to stimulate economic development and could not
maintain control over the military. He was put out of
office in 1960.
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Scon after the overthrow of the Rhee government, there
was for the first tine, a cooling of the tensions between
the North and the South. Political instability in the South
led tc the rise of the Park government. Students in the
South were involved in a movement for national reunifica-
tion. During this time period, the North first proposed its
idea cf a confederal government. It was suggested under
this plan that both countries would retain their political
systems and governmental activities on an independent basis,
tut would jointly regulate their economic and cultural
activities through a "supreme national committee" [27],
Even though the North had proposed this idea of a confederal
government, they continued to promote in the South the idea
of a revclutionary struggle against the US and the EOK
government. The proposal for a confederal government was
rejected by the South.
D. 1961-1970
This period began with the rise to power in the South of
Park Chung Hee. His fervent anti-communist stance caused
the Ncrth tc examine its policies on security and unifica-
tion. Within several months of Park's coup, the DFEK
concluded mutual defense treaties with the USSR and the PRC.
Throughout this period the North continued its two line
34
method of unification proposals. These proposals were
highly contradictory. The first proposal was to continue
the revolutionary struggle in the South against the US and
the ECK government- The OS involvement in Vietnam prcrably
fueled this idea of a revolutionary struggle in the South
since the guerilla style of warfare being waged was seen as
being a successful tool against the US.
At the same time this line was proposed the North was
also advocating unification along peaceful lines, through
several intermediate steps. This confusion on unification
policy by the North combined with the anti-communist stance
of the Park government contributed little to the advancement
of unifying Korea during this period. As part of their
drive for revolutionary struggle in the South, the North
began a massive campaign to strengthen its economic base and
its armed forces. Eefense expenditures grew at a rapid
pace. The increase resulted from a perceived new threat as
a result of: the escalation of the US involvement in
Vietnam, the deepening of the Sino-Soviet dispute, the EOK's
participation in the Vietnam War, the EOK-Japan normaliza-
tion, the economic growth that had started in the South, and
the growing strains en the North's economy [28]. Incidents
along the DMZ increased yearly during this period, culni-
nating with the seizure of the US ship Pueblo in 1966 and
the downing of a US EC-121 aircraft in 1969.
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North Korea, seeing that its idea of revolutionary
struggle in the South was not working, embarked or, another
route in order to gain legitimacy for its position. It
began to elicit support from Third World countries in order
to gain a more favorable position in the UN on the
unification issue. The number of UN members voting for
pro-North Korean resolutions in the General Assembly
increased from 21 in 1966 to 24 in 1967, 25 in 1968, and 29
in 1969, and 32 in 1S70 [29].
South Korea, in spite of its hard line stance during
this period, made a proposal in 1970 that was intended to
begin a peaceful process of unification. The basic proposal
centered on North Korea ending its goal of military unifica-
tion. The South said it would not oppose North Korean
participation in the UN debates on Korea if the North would
recognize the authority of the UN to deal with the situ-
ation. The North rejected these proposals.
Thus, by 1970 there was on both sides a change in their
basic hard line positions on the unification issue. Beth
sides had made what they thought were concessions, only to
have them rejected by the other side. There was one ether
outcome of the struggle between the North and the South
during this period. The North Korean increase of border
incidents, infiltrations, and the seizure of the Pueblo
caused the US to strengthen its commitment to the South and
to begin the modernization of the ROK Armed forces.
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E. 1971-1973
In April, 1971 the North unveiled a proposal for unifi-
cation that was a najor change from their past policies.
Soon after it was announced, Kim II Sung stated for the
first time that the North would talk with the South Korean
ruling party headed ty Park Chung Hee. The South was forced
to accept the proposals for talks with the North for two
reasons, one internal and one external. First, in the 1971
elections, the opposition candidate Kim Dae Jung came
extremely close to winning the ROX election. This forced
President Park into a situation where he had to do as his
campaign had stated and work towards unification. Second,
the suprise announcement of OS-PEC rapprochement made the
future position of Korea as a whole look uncertain from
Seoul and Pyongyang.
While these talks did have some favorable outcomes, for
example the establishment of a direct communications line
between Seoul and. Pyongyang , in the end the two sides could
not agree en the way that unification should occur. The
North wanted unification to occur first on the governmental
level. Along with that they desired that the armed forces
of" both countries be reduced and that the US withdraw all
its troops from the 5CK. The South saw unification cccuring
as a gradual process beginning with contacts on a much lower
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level that would spread into the political and military
areas. The talks weie broken off in 1973 as each side saw
the futility of dealing with the other.
F. 1973-1979
The breakdown of the North-South talks began a period of
mistrust and standoff between the two Koreas. While there
were no significant contacts between the two governments
during this period, there were some developments in Korea
that fueled the separation. In 1974, the North proposed
that the 1953 Armistice be made the permanent peace treaty.
This would cause the withdrawal of all US forces from the
peninsula. The -idea was rejected by the US. The North
began to conclude formal diplomatic recognition with nations
around the world. Ihis was done to gain UN support on the
Korean question. Thus, in 1975, the North was able for the
first time to have a resolution in the UN on the Korean
issue passed in its favor.
The OS, under President Carter, announced in 1977 that
all US ccmbat troops would be withdrawn from Korea. This
announcment had two major effects in Korea. First, the
North increased its bcrder incidents along the DMZ. Several
major tunnels were found under the DMZ coming from the
North. Second, as a result of the proposed US withdrawal,
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the ECK armed forces began to be modernized and the EOK
began to supply a majority of its own arms for its forces.
The RCK economy was growing at a fast rate and its trade
around the world was expanding. By the end of 1978, both
the North and the South had a certain measure of support
from ether countries. The interests of the US, the ?HC,
DSSfi, and Japan were firmly set in the region. The question
of US trcop withdrawal was the major issue to be settled.
G. 1979-1980
1979 was an interesting year in the unification arena.
There was a renewal of interest between the North and the
South as -a result of the US-PRC normalization. Talks were
held in early 1979, but did not prove fruitful. The dele-
gates could not get past the preliminary stages of creden-
tials and agenda. The US made a dramatic shift in its troop
withdrawal policy when it was announced that a new view of
tne threat posed by the North would cause the US to keep its
combat troops in Korea.
In July 1979, a joint communique by President Carter and
President Park suggested that talks be held to reduce
tensions between the North and the South. The North ulti-
mately rejected the proposal. The assassination of
President Park in late 1979 and the internal protlems of
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the South caused hy the assassination put progress towards
unification on hold. In January 1980, the North in a series
cf letters proposed that talks on unification be held at the
highest levels of the two governments. Talks were held over
the next nine months, but again proved fruitless. There
were no substantive unification issues discussed.
H. 1981-PBESENT
In a dramatic change of policy, President Chun of the
EOK proposed on January 12, 1S3 1 that an exchange cf visits
by the tcp leaders of the South and the North occur "without
any conditions attached and free of obligation" [30]. The
North rejected this proposal cne weeK later. Later that
year, in June, Chun proposed a summit meeting with Kim II
Sung, with the date and place of the meeting to be chosen by
the North. This proposal was also rejected by the North
within a week.
In. the early fall of 1981 the Red Cross, who had been
instrumental in earlier tries at establishing dialogue
between the two Koreas, proposed a meeting of their repre-
sentatives from the North and the South to discuss the the
problem cf the division of families caused by the separation
of the country. In November 1981, the ROK Ministry of
Culture proposed joint archeological work be performed by
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the North and the Scuth as a base for low level contacts
that night increase cooperation between the two countries.
In his New Year's Address in January 1982, President
Chun called for the formation of a Consultative Conference
on Korean Unification that would draft a joint Constitution
for a united Korea. In February, 1982 the ROK Minister of
National Unification called for joint cooperation on 20
pilot projects for North-South exchange in an effort to
increase low level cooperation. This proposal was firmly
rejected by Kim II Sung who instead called for a unification
conference of 50 persons from both the North and the Scuth.
However, as stated by Premier Kim, this conference would not




Ill- DEVELOPING A THEORETICAL MODEL
Game theory is a specialized form of bargaining and
decision-making theory. It can be defined as a theory of
rational decision making in conflict situations. It deals
with human processes whereby one decision maker is ret in
complete control of ether decision making units that are
involved in the game. The decision making leads the players
to cheese cne outcone over another. The interests of the
players evolve from the values they assign to each of the
possible outcomes. Models of such situations, as they are
perceived in game theory, involve, (1) a set of decision
makers, called players; (2) a set of strategies available to
each player; (3) a set of outcomes, each of which is a
result cf particular choices of strategies made by the
players en a given play of the game; and (4) a set of
payoffs accorded to each player in each of the possible
outcomes [31].
Prior to the development of the model it is necessary to
discuss three concepts that affect the game. They are all
integral parts of the game as it is played. To understand
the usefulness of the model a policymaker must have a grasp
of each area. The areas are: (1) the necessary requirements
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for a game to exist; (2) the definition of rationality as it
is applied to the model; and (3) utility maximization as it
is affected by rationality.
A. GAME BEQOIREHEHTS
In game theoretical terms the following elements are the
necessary prerequisites for establishing a game:
1. two or mere players are trying to get the best of
each other (zero sum game) , or achieve a solution
that is best fcr both (non zero sum game)
,
2. a payoff or a set of payoffs which may mean various
things to the players because of discrepancies in
their value systems,
3. a set of ground rules or guidelines which must be
observed if the game is to be played according to the
definition of the game,
4. information conditions which determine the quality
and quantity cf knowledge which each player has of
the environment and of the choices made by the ether
player,
5- the total environment in which the game is played
whether fully perceived by the players or not,
6. the interaction of competing moves, in which every
choice by one may prompt the other to modify subse-
quent choices. £32]
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The situation in Korea, insofar as the unification issue
is concerned, meets the above criteria in that:
1. there are at least two players (North and South
Korea) and possibly more (US, USSR, PEC, Japan) who
have a direct interest in the stalemated Korean situ-
ation,
2. there are payoffs to be achieved by both South and
North Korea in total unification, the status quo, or
in a unification that would result in the country
being controlled totally by one or the other,
3. the rules and guidlines which exist are such things
as the 1953 Arnistice Agreement, international law in
general, and the constraints placed on the two Kcreas
by their major supporters,
4. the knowledge gained by each side comes from involve-
ment in tne wcrll community economically and diplo-
matically. The information conditions which exist
then are the same as for the rest of the world commu-
nity,
5. the total environment of the game is the current
wcrld situation with its many complexities. It
therefore contains both knowns and unknowns based on
the perceptions and misperceptions of the countries
involved,
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6. competing moves have occurred since 1953. Whether
these moves (proposals for a solution) have promoted
a change in the other side's subsequent choice is
debatable. However, some modification of the orig-
inal positions has occurred.
In order to develop a tneory, we will assume rational action
ty both sides. In doing so, it is necessary to define what
is meant by rationality and more importantly how this defi-
nition is to be applied to the game theoretical model.
B. DEFIMIHG RATIONAIITY
At the outset it must be assumed that the model relies
on "rationally correct" behavior as opposed to actual
behavior that may occur in conflict situations.
A theory of rational behavior in game situations will
achieve its highest usefulness both in a theoretical
analysis and in practical policy making only if it
supplies a unigue well-defined standard of rationality,
i.e., a unigue determinate solution, for., every possible
game situation-at least when we know the player's
utility functions and the rules of the game, specifying
the players' strategy possibilities and their access to
information and communication. [33]
If one assumes irrationality' then it is highly unlikely that
a worthwhile theory could be establisned. There would be
few, if any, conclusions that could be drawn from a theory
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tased on irrationality. This is true since irrationality
would negate any logical premise drawn from a aodel that was
tased on irrational behavior.
The situation becomes for the players a game that they
are trying to win. That is, each player is attempting to
achieve an objective which the other party in the game is
trying to deny them. Likewise, one must assume that they
believe their opponect is acting "rationally" and is in
pursuit of an objective by trying to manipulate or second
guess his opponent.
It is important to understand what is meant by the term
rational. According to James March and Herbert Simon the
classic notion of rationality has the decision-maker choose
"optiiral" strategies in the following environment:
1. When we first encounter him in the decision-making
situation, he already has laid out before him the
whole set of alternatives from which he will choose
his action- This set of alternatives is simply
"given"; the theory does not tell how it was
obtained.
2. Ic each alternative is attached a set of
ccnseguences- the events tnat will ensue if that
particular alternative is chosen. Here the existing
theories fall into three categories:
v
'a) ce~ tn iz.ll :
theories that assume the decision maker has cor^itte
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and accurate Xicwledge cf tae consequences that will
fellow on each alternative, (b) risk; theories that
assume accurate knowledge of a probability distribu-
tion of the consequences of each alternative. (c)
unce rtai nty : theories taat assume that the conse-
quences or each alternative belong to some suLset or
all possible consequences, buz the decision aaker
cannot assign definite rr cbabili ties to the occurence
of particular consequences.
3. At the outset the decision maker nas a "utility func-
tion" or a "preference ordering" that ranks all sets
of consequences from the most preferred to the least
preferred.
4. The decision maker selects the alternative leading to
the preferred set of consequences. In the case of
certainj:^ the choice is ambiguous. In the case of
risk rationality is usually defined as tue choice or
that alternative for whicn tne expected utility is
greatest. In the case of uncertainty the definition
of rationality becomes problematic; consider the
worst set of consequences that may follow from each
alternative, then select the alternative whose worst
set of consequences is preferred to the worst sets
attached to other alternatives. [34]
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Ihete are difficulties with tnis aodti of rationality as
March and Simon point out. First it only agrees with tne
ccmiou-sense notions or reality in tne case or certainty.
Second, it aak.es three important demands on tne chcice-
making mechanism. It assumes (1) that ail the alternatives
cf choice are "given"; (2) tnat .ill the consequences
attached to eacn alternative are known; and (3) that the
raticnai man has a ccaplete utility-ordering system for all
possible sets of consequences.
March and Simon
i.
Cint out one problem in rationality
assuap ticn. Since decision makers do not have all possible
inforaation about the conseguences of all available choices
they are "subjectively" and not "objectively" raticnai.
Thus rationality defends on the "frame or reference" or a
given decision maker.
Karch and Simon's theory of rational choice bas two
fundamental elements: (1) choice is always exercised with
respect to a limited, ap^r oxiaiato, simplified model of the
real situation, (2) the elements of the definition of the
situation are not "jiven" - that is, we do not take these as
data of our theory - but are themselves the outcome of
psychological and sociological processes, including the
chooser's own activities and the activities of others ir. his
environment. [35] They derive tneir definition of ration-
ality given the "subjective" nature of. the decisior. aakers
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choice as fiidii. j a H satisf actor y" alternative; .s op. ;i-_ to
the classic definition in which findirj the " vjtimal -1 &r-
native is the goal. An alternative is "optimal" if: (1)
there exists a set of criteria that permits all alternatives
to be compared, and (2) the alternative in question is
preferred, ry these criteria, to all other alternatives. An
alternative is "satisfactory" if: (1) there exists a set of
criteria that describes minimally satisfactory alternatives,
an 1 (2) the alternative in question meets or exceeds all
these criteria [36].
Ihe idea of choosing a satisfactory alternative by the
two Koreas will be assumed since it is based on the knowl-
edge of the choices as seen by the two players. It is not
tased en criteria that contains all possible Knowleige about
the alternative choices. Thus in saying that a choice is
c. t^L'ai for the two players, this assessment is be Lasta on
the fact that they are acting on the know led je the} haw at
that given point in the game.
C. UTILITY MAXIMIZATION
Game theory is concerned with the participants choice of
the most appropriate means to a given end. As can be seen,
this can be expanded to mean not only choices of alternative
means to a specific end but also choices among alternative
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ends. This need for alternative ends arises because it is
not possible to attais all the ends at the same time. The
players find themselves in a situation that has a any
possible outcomes with different values assigned to each
outcome.
The individual must consider how to achieve as much as
possible, taking into account that there are others
whose goals differ from his own and whose actions have
an affect on all. The decision maker in a game faces a
cress-purpose optinization problem. He must adjust his
plans not only to his own desires and abilities but also
to the desires and abilities of otners. [37]
In the case of the two Koreas, this is the choice among war,
the status guo, a peaceful unification*, or unification
under either Communist or Democratic rule. Borrowing from
economic theory, in crder to achieve a certain end a player
must be willing to forgo the benefits of the ends that were
not chosen. One then creates opportunity costs that must be
born when choosing one end over another. As in economics, a
player will attempt to maximize his benefits from a set of
given ends. This is defined as his utility function. In
"Peaceful unification" is used for the lack of a better
term. What is being referred to is the optimal solution
which both North and South Korea say they desire. This
would be a solution that would allow a peaceful unification
to occur that would satisfy the majority of both sides goals
and desires. While the chances seem remote for this to
happen, it is nevertheless both sides ultimate goal.
50
defining the utility function one must remember;
the usefulness of simple utility maximization as a defi-
nition of rational behavior is largely restricted to the
case of certainty, in which the choice of outcomes of
alternative actions are kncwn to the decision maker in
advance, because they cannot be influenced significantly
by chance or the actions of other individuals. It has
remained for modern decision making theory to find a
more satisfactory definition for rational behavior in
the cases of risk and of uncertainty. This has been
accomplished by showing that in these cases, if a given
decision maker's choice behavior satisfies the appro-
priate rationality postulates, then it can be repre-
sented as maximization of his expected utility. [38]
The definition of "bounded" rationality as presented by
March and Simon satisfies these requirements. This is true
since a rational player is defined as one who attempts to
maximize his gains and minimize his losses based on his
knowledge and the constraints of the situation as it exists
at any given poirt in time.
The choice among alternative ends is based on utility
functions for each payoff. In choosing a given outcome,
thereby deriving the benefits of the payoffs (utilities)
from that outcome, a given player must take into account two
factors. First, the choice between payoffs gained from an
outcome must be weighed against the payoffs a player forgoes
in net choosing other outcomes. This choice is based mostly
on the opponents perceived choice of outcomes since they are
in an interdependent relationship. As rational actors, they
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are utilizing bounded rationality as tne basis for their
choice cf outcome. Both players will try to maximize the
gains received for their side.
Second, the players must take into account the risks
involved in choosing a given outcome. This gets at the
heart cf the dilemma. In the case of Korean unification
this idea of risk avoidance explains why the status quo
continues. The payeffs to be gained by mutual cooperaticn,
as represented by complete unification, are conceivably
greater than the payoffs a player would receive from contin-
uing the status quo. However, the players continue to
choose the status quo since the risks of taking a chance at
cooperation are perceived by the players as being great. In
moving towards the jcint cooperative outcome a player risks
the chance of being deceived by tne other player. This
would cause his payoffs to be smaller than if he remained in
the status quo. This would leave the opponent, the player
who did net cooperate, with a payoff higher than what he
receives frcm the status quo. Thus each player, in choosing
an outcome, must balance the payoffs to be gained from that
outcome against the risks involved in choosing that outcome.
In simple terms, there are advantages and disadvantages
that a player must consider when choosing an outcome. The
players choose an outcome given the information they know
about how that choice will affect them, their perception of
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how their choice will affect the other flayer, and their
test guess as to what choice their opponent will make. A
player knows how the first one will affect him. The second
and third factors are basically unknown. Therefore,
anything which increases the players knowledge in these two
unknown areas will increase the chance that they will choose
the outcome that has the highest mutual payoff and least
risk for both players.
D. 1IEES OF GAMES
There are three general classifications of games.
First, there are games of chance. An example of this type
of game would be craps. Second, are games of skill. These
are characterized by most types of sports. Third, are games
of strategy. A strategy is a set of instructions which
state in advance how a player intends to select each move
until the end of the game, taking into account the knowledge
that he will have available at the time at which he is
called ufon to select his move [39]. The key element in
this type of game is that choices are made by the players
tased en conditions set by the game itself and the choices
made by ether players.
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It is possible that chacce can be an element of games of
strategy, tut unlike the actual players, chance has no
vested interest in the outcome of the game. The essence of
this type of game is that it involves decision makers with
different and competing goals, interests, and objectives.
Chance and skill are an inhereDt part of international rela-
tions/ however, these two types of games in their pure state
do not have a direct application to the international arena.
As components of games of strategy they do play a part.
Thus, only games of strategy have serious application to
international relaticrs.
Within games of strategy three groups can be identified:
(1) games with identical interests, (2) games with opposite
interests, and (3) games with mixed interests. In
attempting to describe international relations, games with
identical interests have little or not utility. Therefore,
the application of game theory to international conflict in
general can be done in terms of opposite interests or mixed
interests. Games with opposite interests are known as zero
sum games while those with mixed interests are known as non
zero sum, variable sum, or mixed motive games. [40]
Prior to developing the game theoretical model it
becomes important to understand whether the situation in
Korea is to be viewed in terms of a zero sum game or a non
zero sum game.
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1 • 2ero Sum Games
The zero sum game is characterized by the fact that
the sum cf all payoffs is equal to zero. Inherently then,
anything that one player wins the other player loses. Tnese
gains and losses, tc be truly zero sum, must be exactly
equal. Chess, checkers, and two person poker are pure exam-
ples cf this type game.
The application of the zero sum concept to interna-
tional conflict has limited, if any, use [41]. To illus-
trate this point Kenneth Boulding devised the following
example.
He may ask with sone justification why anyone would ever
play a truly zero sum game. The long-run gains for each
party are clearly zero, which will be true in any game
of absolutely fair gambling. Unless, therefore, there
are payoffs in terms of excitement of the pleasure of
playing the game for its own sake, there would be no
incertiTe to play the game. It is easy to devise a game
where, at the equilibrium minimax one party has a posi-
tive gain but the ether party must have an equal less
and hence will refuse to play the game. If A tries to
bribe the other party to play the game, he will have tc
pay him at least a penny, in which case A's gain is
reduced to zero and 3*s raised to zero. This illus-
trates a fundamental principle that, in the zero sum
game, there can be no bribery, for the bribe would have
to be so great as to make it not worthwile for the
briber. Bribery always suggests some kind of
positive-sum game. [42]
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Kenneth N. Kaltz in his hook 3an the St ate and War:
§ Theoretical Analysis also sees little utility in trying do
describe the actions of states in the international system
in tens of the zero sum game.
In a zero sum game, the problem is one of distribution,
not at all one of production. 3ut the activities in
which men and states are engaged seldom correspond to
the zero sum model. The protlem may be on of production
as well as distribution. The game, in the terminolgy of
von Neumarn and Morgenstern, becomes a general game. In
a general game, "the advantage of one group of players
need not be synoncmous with the disadvantage of the
others. In such a game moves-or rather changes in
strategy-may exist which are advantageous tc both
groups. In other words, there may exist an opportunity
for genuine increases of productivity, simultaneously in
all sectors of society." This is a situation in which
we have not just a pie to divide but the problem cf how
much pie to make as well. [43]
Waltz further explains that the game under these condition
can mcve towards two extremes: (1) it may become a simple
problem in maximization, all the players may cooperate to
make the largest pie; or (2) all the players may be so
intent on the question of how the pie already in existence
should be divided that they forget about the possibility of
increasing the amount each will have by working together to
make more of it. Thus, instead of a simple maximization
problem, the game reverts to a zero or constant sum game.
There is another possibility. It may be that nobody likes
pie, or that everybody likes something else better. In this
case the gane is not flayed at all. [44]
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Given the limited use of zero sum games in
explaining international relations, it is easy to see why
the conflict between North and South Korea is not zero sum.
The two Koreas fall into Waltz's second category described
above. The gains and losses involved in any interaction
wouid not be equal. In the context of unification, it would
be an oversimplification to think that any agreement, no
matter how small, would involve concessions by the North and
South that wouid be equal. Beyond that, a zero sum game
assumes exactly opposite interests at tne start of the game.
In Korea, the two players have a mutual interest, the unifi-
cation of their country. Thus it is the means to acheive
their ultimate interest and not the interests themselves
that are in opposition. The South and North will stand to
both gain and lose in total unification. These gains and
losses would not be equal on both sides since identical
situations do not exist in the two countries. The situation
then becomes one with both mutual and conflicting interests,
or a non zero sum game.
2 . Non Zero sum Ga mes
There are mutual interests involved in the situation
in the conflict between North and South Korea. It will take
cooperation in order to achieve these interests. The type of
game that best fits is the non zero sum or variable sum
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game. This type of game is characterized by having not only
rewards for mutual cooperation, but also penalties for
mutual ncn-cooperaticn. A variable sum game is net only a
game of competition, insofar as the contestants try to win
from cne another; but they are also games of coordination,
in that these players will also jointly gain or lose
according to their ability to coordinate their mcves in
accordance with their common interests [45].
The study and application of two person non zero sum
games is more complex than the simple zero sum model. Such
things as the relative power of one player versus the ether,
the relative amounts of gains and losses for each side, and
the strategies employed by each side must be taken into
account when applying this type of game to a real situation.
Anatol Hapoport and ll. Guyer have established that there are
in fact 78 types of two person non zero sum games [46]. The
variations in -the gajies are derived from the symmetry or
asymmetry of the game based on the ordinal classification of
the preferences for a set of given outcomes. These varia-
tions tended to make the majority of tne games asymmetric*
The asymmetry described here comes from the structure of
the ordinal preferences in defining the game. It is a func-
tion of the relative power differences between the two
players of the values achieved by choosing one outcome over
another.
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The two-person game that will be developed ir the
next chapter will shew that in the case of Korean unifica-
tion the gane is symaetric as far as the ordinal ranking of
the possible outcomes is concerned. Each sides best choice
is the others worst. Both are striving for the same ulti-
mate goal, unification, while being caught in the status
quo. What is not symmetric is the payoffs that each side
would receive from each given outcome. It would be an
impossible task to try to quantify the amount of payoffs
that wculd be received or even the ratio of the payoffs for
each side fcr a given outcome. Knowing the amount of the
payoffs that each side would gain from a given outcome is
not a prerequisite tc an understanding of the game and how
it works. It is important, however, to realize that there
are differences in the payoffs for each side that would be
derived from a given outcome. These differences will play a
part in the latter stages of the game. Given that the game
upon which the model will be based is symmetric, at least
from the point of view of the preference order of the
outcomes for both sides, there are still two other factors
to be determined prior to the establishment of the formal
model.
First, the two person non zero sum game can be
played in two ways; cooperatively or noncooperati vely. The
distinguishing factor between them is communication. Tn a
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cooperative game, the players are permitted to communicate
with each ether directly and to exchange information in
advance concerning their intended choices. In a non-
cooperative game, overt communication is not permitted hat
the choice cf each player becomes obvious to the other after
every play. There is however, a slight ambiguity in this
terminology. Even if a game is non-cooperative insofar as
the rules prohibit evert or direct communication, it is
possible for the players to cooperate tacitly through
inferred communica ticn, by which one player interprets the
other's intention from the kinds of choices he makes in a
long series of plays [47], In the cooperative game, commu-
nication becomes the key to achieving a mutually acceptable
solution. It is, in effect, a bargaining situation in the
classical sense.
In establishing the model, the non-cooperative game
will he assumed. This basically fits the current situation
vis a vis the two Koreas. There is at present nc fcrmal
communication between the two on the issue of unification.
lacit communication dees occur in that statements are made
by both sides on the issue but are subject only to interpre-
tation by the other side. There is no formal communication
that deals with the best cooperative way to achieve a solu-
tion to the problem.
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Second, a distinction is made in the literature
tetween utility and game models. Utility models focus on
the payoff space, that is on the issues in dispute. Game
models focus on alternative bargaining strategies, or the
ways of dealing with the issues [48]. Utility models are
concerned with the actual bargaining situation while the
game models are concerned with the strategy and tactics of
the players. The ncdel to be constructed for this study
will be the game model variety since the main concern is to
examine strategies for resolving the dispute. The
bargaining process itself will be dealt with as a separate
issue. The model as established will aid in understanding
the current situation. Beyond that, the model will act as a
tool in seeing hew to move from the current non-cooperative
game to a cooperative game.
E- TEE MODEL: PBISOMEB'S DILEMMA AND UNIFICATION
Two prisoners accused of the same crime are kept in
separate cells. Cnly a confession by one or both can
lead to conviction. If neither confesses, tney can be
convicted of a lesser offense, incurring a penalty of
one month in prison. If both plead guilty of the major
crime, both receive a reduced sentence, five years. If
one confesses and the other does not, the first gees
free (for having turned State's evidence), while the
other receives a full sentence, ten years in prison.
Under the circumstances is it rational to admit guilt or
deny it? If my partner confesses (so each prisoner
might reason) , I stand to gain by confessing, for in
that case, I get five years instead of ten years, if I
don't confess. If, on the other hand, my partner does
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not confess, it is stiil to my advantage to confess, for
a ccrfession sets me free, while otherwise I oust serve
a month. Therefore I am better off confessing regard-
less of whether my partner does or not. The 'partner',
being in the same situation, reasons the same way.
Consequently, both confess and are sentenced to five
years. Had they not confessed, they would have been
sentenced to only a month. In what sense, therefore,
can cne assert that 'to confess 1 was the prudent (or
rational) course of action. The anecdote is attributed
to A.W. Tucker, and the game depicting the situation has
been christened appropriately "Prisoner's Dilemma". It
is an example of a two-person non-constant-sum game, cne
in which some cutccaes are preferred by both players to
other outcomes. The dilemma arises from the circum-
stance that in the absence of communication and hence of
making binding agreements, there is no way of rational-
izing the choice of action, which if taken by both
players, benefits bcth. [49]
Prisoner's Dilemma is the type of a two-person game
which has a configuration of payoffs that gives both players
dominant incentives, in the absence of an enforceable agree-
ment to the contrary, to choose strategies that together
yield both players a less desireable outcome than if bcth
had made opposite chcices. The game can be either coopera-
tive cr ncn-cooperative in that overt communication between
the players may or may not be permitted. In either case the
choices, or alternating plays, of each side become obvious
to the other side after each round of play. In the case of
Korean unification the plays are the alternating proposals
made by each side in an effort to elicit cooperation from
the other side.
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1- Ik£ 112 Matrix
The situation in Korea can ne viewed in simple
game- theoretical terms as a conflict netween two parties
whose interests do not fully coincide. Eoth sides assume
different values they can derive from the range of possible
outcomes of the situation. They also maintain a perception
of the values for each outcome that the other player might
conceivably receive. This type of game can be represented
by a rectangular array or matrix. The horizontal rows
represent the decisions available to one player while the
vertical columns represent the decisions available to the
other player. The cells of the matrix represent the
outcomes of these decisions (Fig 3.1). The numbers in the
cells caii represent (1) the ordinal preference of the
possible decisions fcr each player based on the value, or
payoff, cf that outcome and his perception of the value, or
payoff, of that outcome for the opposing player; or (2) the
actual values, in real or relative terms, of the payoff
derived from a given outcome.
In a zero sum game the values of the payoffs are
symmetrical. What one side wins, the other side loses.
Thus, in a zero sum situation, the outcome is the result of
the relative power positions of the two players. Each
player has a best, or most rational strategy that will
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maximize his gains and minimize his losses. Given that both
sides act rationally, they each have a "best" choice avail-
able to them.
In a non zero sum game the situation is much
different. The values of the payoffs derived from the situ-
ation are not exactly the same for both sides. This then is
a most crucial point. The resolution of the conflict in
this situation can go beyond the simple choice of each side
for its own most rational choice. It becomes possible
through negotiation or arbitration to point out to both
sides a compromise solution- This solution may not meet
both sides expectations as regards the payoffs from their'
optimum choice, but it can maximize gains and minimize
losses for each side such that the conflict is resolved.
In using a 2 X 2 matrix as a model, its limitations
must be recognized. Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing outline
these limitations as follows. First, their interpretation
is similar to other models of rational behavior.
Gaming models do net describe the actual play of experi-
mental subjects; they set up a pattern of constraints on
the players' choices, and these constraints reward and
punish the players in certain ways and induce them tc
behave in certain ways as they learn to master its
dynamics. Similarly, the 2X2 game can be used to
describe the basic structure of the crisis situation,
that is, the game. [50]
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Second, they established that the alternative
choices available tc the players are not necessarily
specific strategies but general directions in which specific
strategies may travel. The choices are so limited because
of the constraints placed on tne players by their range of
knowledge about the choices and the outcomes of those
choices.
Snyder and Eiesing make a further distinction
between two kinds of matrices: objective and subjective.
The objective matrix represents the real structure of the
conflict. It consists of the ways in which the military,
diplomatic, and economic acts of each player actually affect
the ether. These ways are determined by the actual resources
of the flayers, tie manner in which the resources are
deployed, and the resources and probable actions of the
ether participants [51]- The subjective matrix for each
player consists of their own valuations of possible outcomes
and his estimate of tie valuations of the other player.
It is virtually impossible to construct an objective
matrix since the objective situation is not fully known and
cannot be quantified. Even if the objective situation were
known it is of such fluid nature that an accurate matrix
could not be constructed. Therefore, a composite matrix
will be constructed displaying both North and South Korea's
ordinal preference of outcomes and, inherently, the esti-
mated ordinal outcome preference of the other player.
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figure 3. 1 Prisoner 1 s Dilemma as a 2 X 2 Matrix.
Figure 3.1 shows the Prisoner's Dilemma as a 2 X
2 matrix [52]. It is subject to the following conditions:
1. 2(x1) is greater than x2 x3 is greater than 2{xU)
2. x3 is greater than x1
3. x3 is greater than x2
4. x4 is greater than x2.*
"C" and "D" represent strategies in which players ^ould
"cooperate" or "defect".
*The values that the variable *x' would have assigned
wculd come from a statistical analysis of the utility
functions of each outcome for each player. The
values that will be listed in figure 3.2 represent
the order of choice of the available outcomes, and
net the probability of that outcome for the players.
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What this means is that for both players,
strategy 2 dominates strategy 1 (A2 dominates A1 for the row
player and B2 dominates 31 for the column player).
However,the choice (£2,E2) results in a payoff (x4) to each
player smaller than (x1) , the payoff associated with choice
(A1, E1) [53].
2 . Kpr ean Unification as a 2 X 2 Ma tr ix
Given these fcur outcomes:
1. "peaceful" unification, that is, having the issue
settled by bargaining and mutual agreement regardless
of the political system (both sides ultimate goal)
;
2. unification under a communist regime (ROK accepting
the CPRK's present proposals);
3. unification under a democratic regime (DPHK accepting
the ROK ' s present proposals)
;
4. maintenance of the status guo;
it is possible using the above matrix (figure 3.1) to show
unification as a 2 x 2 matrix. This matrix is shown in
figure 3.2. The nunbers within the guadrants are a repre-
sentation of the order of preference among the four choices
for each side. Thus North Korea's choices in order of pref-
erence are:
































Figure 3.2 Korean Unification as a 2x2 Matrix.
3. the status guo,
4. unification under a democratic system.
South Korea's order cf preference among the choices is:
1. unification under a democratic system,
2. "peaceful" unification
3. the status que,
4. unification under a communist system.
What can be said about these four outcomes as they
apply to the Prisoner's Dilemma? First, neither North nor
South Korea sees the status quo as the worst chcice.
Second, each side sees the opponents most desired outcome as
its worst possible outcome. Third, each side prefers a
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"peaceful" unix ica ticn" to the status quo. And lastly,
neither side prefers a "peaceful" unification" to its own
test choice. The result of this is, as in the matrix in
figure 3.1, the preferred choice is the dominating strategy
for both North (E2 dominating B1) and South (A2 dominating
A1) . Specifically, North Korea prefers a communist settle-
ment of unification to either the status quo or a "peaceful"
unification. South Korea prefers a democratic settlement to
either the status que or a "peaceful" unification. Thus,
the dilemma that faces both sides is: since neither side can
have its own best choice, they settle for the status quo.
This is done in spite of the fact that the possibility of a
peaceful settlement to unification is exists (a "peaceful"
unification) that might be better for both sides than their
cwn optimal choice. Neither side can choose collective
interest over self interest because they are forced to
assume that the other will follow the most prudent course
[54]. Thus, as in the explanation of the Prisoner's
Dilemma, tcth sides decide it is in their best interest to
"confess" and therby maintain their own best choice as their
bargaining position. This causes the status quo to remain
in effect.
The basic problem, simply stated, is to get both
players to move from choice A2,B2 (Status Quo), tc choice
A1,B1 ("Peaceful" unification). Solving the dilemma then
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has two components. First, the game structure must he iroved
from ncn-ccoperati ve to cooperative. This would regin
interaction between the playeis at one or more levels.
Second, as the game Ecves towards being fully cooperative it
hecomes a classic bargaining situation. Thus, the
bargaining process is crucial to the resolution of the
conflict.
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IV. THE RC1E OF THE FOOR MAJOR POWERS
There is little question that the four major powers, the
US, PBC, OSSR, and Japan play a vital role in Korea. Their
interests extend far beyond the unification issue. In areas
such as economic or security interests, their policies and
roles as actors in the region are relatively easy to iden-
tify. Their involvement in the unification issue however,
is less clearly defined. Therefore, discussing unification
cannot he done without examining the role that the four
major powers play. There are five questions that must be
answered in order to get at the real nature of the four
power's involvement. They are:
1. What are the effects on the Prisoner's Dilemma game
when more than two players are involved?
2. What are the interests of each of the powers in
Korea?
3. Can any of the four powers play a third party inter-
mediary role?
4. Do the four major powers want Korean unification?
5. What influence do the four powers have on the actions
of either of the Korea's?
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A. GAME THEORY AHD TEE FOO E POBEES
There are two possible roles that extra players in a
game can have. First, the extra players can be direct
participants on egual status with the other players in the
game. Thus far, the discussion of Korean unification has
centered on the 2x2 matrix. If the role of the four major
powers is that of egual players, the game is no longer a two
person game, but becomes what in game theoretical terms is
described as an N-person game, with N being the number of
players. The complexity of the game is increased enor-
mously, since the matrix is no longer a 2 x 2 matrix but an
N x N matrix. The permutations of interaction, strategies,
and conflicts becomes so enormous that constructing a model
for conflict resolution is a nearly impossible task. It is
this dilemma type game that describes the international
relations arena. It is for that reason that international
relations theory is so complex and diverse in its
explanations.
The question to be answered is whether or not Korean
unification, with the four power involvement, is to be
viewed as this type of game. If this situation existed,
each individual player in the game would be on the same
level. That is, they would be direct participants in the
conflict. As regards the four powers, this is not true for
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two reasons. First, the level of involvement of the four
powers is not the same as that of the two Koreas. For
thirty years, unification has been at the forefront of the
two Korea's domestic and foreign policies. This cannct tie
said fcr the four outside powers. The risks and the payoffs
involved frcm each of the four possible outcomes are not the
same for the outside powers as they are for the two Koreas.
Second, the situation in the international arena for the
four powers and the two Koreas is much different. The four
powers action or lack of action is easily affected by ether
"games" cr conflicts in which they are involved throughout
the wcrld.
The second way in which the role of the four outside
powers can be viewed in the context of Korean unification is
by means of "alliances". What then are the effects that the
alliances would have en the unification issue? Studies have
shown that group size may have an effect on cooperation in
gaming situations. There are two important factors to
understand. First, if the goals and interests of the
players in a group are for the most part the same, then the
game, in this case the Prisoner's Dilemma, is in reality
reduced again to a two person game. The factors that affect
a two person game that hav € been previously discussed would
apply in this situation. This means that it is possible the
two opposing sides; the DPBK, PEC, USSR, and the US, EOK,
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Japan may themselves be caught in a "Prisoner's Dilemma"
that is larger than the one that involves the two Koreas.
This interpretation assumes that there is no linkage between
the flayers on each side. This is definitely not the case.
Even en the unification issue, the four powers seem to have
more in common (keeping the status quo) than they have
differences.
Second, the relationship between the size of the group
and the amount of cooperative behvior demonstrated may be
positive cr negative depending on the way in which indi-
vidual and group payoffs are affected by variations in the
size of the group [55]. The relative payoffs for each
member of the group fcr each of the outcomes will also have
an effect on the amcunt of cooperation exhibited by each
player. The larger the group size, the less cooperative
behavior is exhibited [56]. The effect that the four powers
have en the unification issue can best be determined by
looking at the interests each has in Korea, and determining
whether or not anyone but the two Koreas really want
unification.
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B. TEE INTERESTS OF THE FOOR POWERS
Given what each of the four powers gets from its rela-
tionship with the two Koreas one almost have to question why
the peninsula is deemed to be so important. There is
undoubtedly a feeling on the part of the four that since
they had a hand in the division of the peninsula they should
do what they can to resolve the situation. Beyond that, the
interests of the four powers in Korea must be viewed in the
context of the international arena.
The Soviet Union's interests can be viewed frcm a
historical perspective. They saw the supposed temporary
division of the peninsula in 1945 as a way of expanding
their influence in Asia. They have always been reluctant to
give up what they have gained. More recently, their inter-
ests in Korea can be viewed in the context of Sine-Soviet
relations or, the lack thereof. Likewise, China's interests
must be viewed in the context of it's relations with the
Soviets. It alsc has an interest in keeping a secure border
with Korea. This is much easier to do if a communist nation
is in control of that border. For both the Soviets and the
TRC the idea of a communist state in power in the North
seems to be a better bet than taking a chance, should
hostilities occur, a country which is less amenable to their
influence would be the result.
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Japanese interests can be viewed from the perspective of
their main foreign pclicy goals. The first of these is to
keep Northeast Asia stable. This will allow for the rest of
the goals to be met. Second, Japan desires to Keep good
relations with the U.S., Europe, the PRC, and anywhere else
where there are strong economic ties. Third, the Japanese
desire tc spend as little on defense as will be allowed. As
long as the U.S. is involved in Northeast Asia, the Japanese
defense coumitment can be kept to a minimum.
The U.S. interests in Korea are based on two factors,
first, the U.S. has strategic interests to protect. Being
involved in Korea allcws a legitmate excuse for the deploy-
ment of U.S. forces to the Far East. Second, and probably
more important, U.S.' interests in Korea have Japan written
all over them [57]. The Japanese lay at the forefront of
all U.S. Asian policy. It is therefore logical to expect
some sinilarity between the actions of Washington and Tokyo
as regards Korea.
C. TEIRE PARTY IHTEBVENTION AND THE FOUR POWERS
The tasic guesticn to be addressed here is whether or
not cne cf the four major powers can play the role of inter-
mediary in an attempt to settle the unification issue. In
the next chapter, the use of a third party is discussed as a
76
means of increasing communication and trust between two
parties in a conflict. The intermediary should be a disin-
terested party. This is a necessity in order to get and
maintain the trust cf both parties in the conflict. As
experimental studies have shown, to increase cooperation and
trust there must either be a mutual like or dislike cf the
intermediary by both parties in the conflict. None of the
four powers meets either one of these criteria. Eased on
these twc factors the chances of one of the major powers
involved in Korea acting as a third party in order to
increase cooperation are remote. The US, while officially
stating that it backs efforts to unify Korea, has dene
little tc aid the situation. In order for the US to act as
an intermediary, it would have to establish relations with
North Korea. So far no administration has been willing to
do so
.
The USSR is prevented from aiding unification for three
reasons. First, there is the chance that they would, under
a unified Korea, lese their influence over the Korean
government. This they would never stand for. Second, the
tensions between the OSSE and the ?RC Keep the USSR from
recognizing the ROK . Third, the basic ideological struggle
with the US would prevent them from acting as an
intermediary.
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The EEC is prevented from acting as a third party for
three major reasons. First, the state of Sino-Soviet rela-
tions. Recognition of the 50K would upset this already-
precarious situation. Second, the Sino-American relations
that have been growing since 1972 might he adversly
affected. Third, PRC relations with Japan would decline.
The Japanese do not like the idea of a unified Kcrea.
If a peaceful solution were found it would leave a large
economic and military power that would be in increasing
competition with then. If a military solution was to occur
in which the North won, the Japanese would have a large
communist nation in close proximity. Should that ever
occur, Japan would risk losing its economic influence in
Korea, confront the prospect of countless anti-ccmmunist
Korean refugees fleeing to the nearest hospitable shore
thereby aggravating Japan's already tense relations with its
Korean ethnic minority and complicating Tokyo's new ties
with the new Korean regime, and - perhaps - risk being drawn
directly into the war as a combatant. [58] Japan is in a
unique situation. They are, because of their relationsnip
with fcoth the North and tne South, the most likely candidate
to act as a third party in increasing cooperation between
them. They are not, however, a disinterested party. It is
this fact that would make it difficult for the Japanese to
act as an intermediary. They also have the most to lose in
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a unified Korea. Japan realizes that a unified Korea would
re able tc close the economic gap with them at a much faster
pace. The Korean's could become serious competitors for
trade throughout the world. They would never be able to
compete head to head with the Japanese, but it is conceiv-
able that their share of the market could grow large enough
to get the Japanese worried. One would also have to ques-
tion what effect the united armed forces of Korea would have
en the Japanese rearmament question.
E. TBE CESIHES OF TBI FOUR POiEBS
Thus far it has been determined that although the four
powers have interests in Korea, (1) they are not tied to
unification, (2) from a game theoretical point of view the
four powers are neither direct participants in the game nor
can the game be described as any more than a two person gaie
that has interested CDlookers, and (3) that none of the four
powers are either willing to or could act as an intermediary
in the situation. Ihe next logical question to answer is
whether cr not the four powers are truly interested in the
unification of the Korean peniDsula.
The four powers have expressed and will continue to
express their desire for unification. They ail, however,
view it as a long term prospect and as such prefer net to do
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anything which might upset the status guo. The four powers,
as Donald Zagoria has argued, are essentially checkmated.
The Soviet Union, China, and the U.S. are all mere
comfortable with the status guo than any of them would
be with any foreseeable change. In particular, as long
as both the Soviet Union and China fear any move that
might drive North Korea closer to the other major power,
both the Soviets and the Chinese will feel their manuev-
eratility is limited. [59]
There are means by which the unification issue can be
resolved. The first is by means of conquest. The likleli-
hood of such an occurrence is distasteful to all the four
outside powers involved. Second, it is possible that nego-
tiation cf an agreement can solve the problem. The negotia-
tions might involve cne of the four powers, but this is net
likely. Should an agreement occur, another problem then
surfaces. Inherent in any agreement is a means to police
the agreement. If cne of the four powers were involved in
the negotiations as an intermediary they would then be the
most likely candidate to act as the policeman of the agree-
ment. The key reascn none of the external powers want to
risk "guaranteeing the guarantee" is simply that none
despite rhetoric to the contrary - see any significant gains
from a unified Korea [60], The other means of obtaining a
negotiated solution to the unification problem is to hav^
the twe Koreas negotitiate the agreement either through a
non-interested third party intermediary or by themselves.
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E. THE FCDE POWEBS INFLUENCE ON THE TWO KOREAS
The four powers while having a stated interest in Korean
Unification will take no actions that will markedly change
the status quo. It has been argued that the majcr powers
are neither willing rcr able tc promote significant progress
toward the unification of Korea [61]. The four powers are
not willing to force the unification of Korea since, for
differing reasons, none of the four would prefer that
outcome. This is true now and will probably hold true for
the forseeable future. The four powers then take a hands
off policy as regards unification. An example of this was
seen in early 1984 when the North proposed talks that for
the first time included the EOK with the U.S. This is some-
thing the U.S. has pushed for since the 1953 Armistice
Agreement. Had the O.S. really been interested in unifica-
tion one would have to question the motive involved in not
taking advantage of the North's concession. The main reason
that the four powers may prefer not to deal with the unifi-
cation issue is that "progress towards unification may tend
toward an inverse relationship to stability in the eyes of
the majcr powers" [62\ rfayne Patterson argues that the key
factor driving the four powers policy toward Korea is
stability. This is dene however, at the expense of progress
towards unification. He further argues that as a result of
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the four powers choosing the stability side of the inverse
relationship, there are two prospects remaining.
On the negative side, as long as the major powers prize
stability above all else in Korea, this has come to mean
a continuation of the status guo, "i.e., division. .. Such
an assessment is indeed bleak for the prospects for the
eventual reunification of Korea, and if accurate,
suggests less likelihood in the coming years. Cn the
positive side, if this analysis is valid, it suggests
that the initiative and will toward reunification
resides within Korea itself. [63]
The game theoretical analy-sis tends to support the fact
that the power to solve the dilemma is held by the two
players themselves. It has been demonstrated that the four
powers are onlookers in the basic two-person game. This
does net mean that they have no interests in the situation
or that they do not derive payoffs from the choices made by
the players in the game. The four powers also can ejeert
both a positive and negative influence on the situation.
The situation is analogous to a football game. The four
powers, like the spectators in a stadium in reality have
little influence over the tactical play of the game. This
is reserved for the coaches and the players. However, like
a crowd at a football game, the four powers can influence
the psychological spirit and feelings of the teams as they
play. In doing so they can have a net positive or negative
effect on either one or both of the teams. Thus, as the
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spectators in a game mast accept the tactical decisions of
the coaches and players, the four major powers must accept
the decisions of the two Koreas on unification and adjust
their policies to best serve their national and strategic
interests tased on those decisions. The two Koreas will be
making a great mistake if they either wait for support from
the four powers or wait for an initiative to come from them.
The four powers may not individually or collectively like
the fact that the two Koreas might be discussing unifica-
tion, but lecause of their relationships with one another
will have to abide by any decisions that might be made.
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V- MOIIIG FBOfl A JCN-COO PEHATI VE TO A COOPERATIVE GAME
Korean unification, as it exists today, can be described
in terms of a non-cocperati ve, non-zero sum game. In this
form the basic Prisoner's Dilemma is extremely difficult to
solve in such a way that the mutually optimal chcice is
gained by both sides. If a solution were to be acheived at
this point, it would most likely be the one in which the
status guo (joint competetive solution) were formalized.
This would mean that both North and South Korea would
receive a lesser amount of payoffs tnan they would if the
dilemma were solved by moving from the joint competitive
outcome to the joint cooperative outcome.
The Prisoner* s Dilemma assumes that no communication
occurs between the two detainees. Even though some discus-
sion (cooperation) has occurred between North and South
Korea on the unification issue, it is structurally a non-
cooperative situation. That is, each side must formulate
its position in a void as to the other side's intentions and
strategies. However, some tacit cooperation can be shewn to
have occured because of the series of proposals and counter
proposals (plays) made by North and South Korea over the
years. Each side in the conflict must then act and react
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according tc the plays made by the other side. With no
formal communication between them they mast depend on their
perceptions to determine the intentions of the other player.
Thus, each side's perceptions of the other side's intentions
are a the najor aspect of the game.
A. UNIFICATION AS A NON-COOPERATIVE PRISONER'S DI1EHMA
In order for a solution to occur that is close to the
joint cooperative outcome, two things must happen. First,
the structure of the game must be changed from non coopera-
tive tc cooperative. There are a number of ways tc accom-
plish this. The key to being successful is increasing
communication and cooperation. Second, as the game moves
towards a fully cooperative situation, the two players must
negotiate in order to make the move from the joint compete-
tive outcome to the joint cooperative outcome. Prior to the
initiaticn cf formal negotiations, both players must under-
stand several factors that affect a cooperative game.
Examples are threats made by a player, the effect cf inter-
dependence en cooperation, the symmetry of the game, and
some psychological factors such as image loss. Once both
sides gain an understanding of these factors and how they
relate tc the cooperative game, the process of formal nego-
tiations can begin.
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Malvern Lumsden, in a study of the Cyprus conflict,
surveyed the game theory literature and arrived at seven
ways to effect change in a non-cooperative game [64], This
change is manifested in the movement towards a cooperative
game. These seven factors are applied to the Korean unifi-
cation issue in crder to determine what steps are necessary
to create a cooperative two person non-zero sum game. Upon
reaching a cooperative game the situation can be handled
through negotiation.
1 • Cis rla yinq t he Matrix
Displaying the matrix of outcome preferences tc each
side may he an icportant aid to conflict resolution.
Studies by Anatol Eapoport and A.M. Chamnah have shewn that
if both sides in a game have the outcome (payoff) matrix
displayed in front of them, their cooperation increases.
[65] While not allowing negotiations or cooperation between
the twe sides, it insures that there is less chance for
misperception by either side as to the order of preference
of the outcomes involved for each side. One important
reason fcr this is that one or both sides may misperceive
the other's utilities for one or more outcomes, so that,
subjectively, they play a game different from the "real" one
[66]. Karl Deutsch in a discussion of game theoretical
research notes:
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cooperative behavior doubled in frequency when the
payoff matrix was prominently and continuously displayed
to roth players throughout the game. This effect was
observed, even thcugh all the players had been told of
the payoff matrix at the start of the game, and their
gains and losses were reported to them after every play.
This finding may add some support to the view of
Immanuel Kant and ether philosophers, that fuller aware-
ness of their own situation will make men more likely to
behave cooperatively and morally. £67]
As a theoretical example, if North Korea thought
that South Korea had as its last preference the status guo,
then by threatening war the North could get the South to
accept a communist unification. If both sides were oper-
ating with similar misperc eptions, they would go to war
rather than accept their actual last preference in the
cutcone (payoff) structure.
By displaying the structure of the game, both
players gain a realistic understanding of the situation as
it exists. Statements and proposals made by one player can
then be taken as stated by the other player since the inter-
pretation of that statement or proposal is more accurate
than it wculd be if the players were operating in a void as
to the structure of the game.
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2- Increasing Ccgmunic ation
At this point a basic question must be asked and
answered. That question is: what are the minimum esentiai
factors needed in crder to have a cooperative exchan3e?
They are basically a mixture of intention and expectation.
In a cooperative exchange one player must intend to do what
the other expects frci him and the other player must intend
to do what his opponent expects from him. In doing so, one
assumes that an ongoing relationship occurs. Thus it is
logical to assume that some form of communication is neces-
sary in crder to accomplish a cooperative situation. What
is communicated are such things as: intentions, expecta-
tions, piomises, proposals for modification of the game, and
threats. A means of enforcing rules and sanctioning viola-
tions must also be established and communicated by both
parties.
How then can communication be used as a vehicle for
building trust? In experimental studies, Morton Deutsch has
shown that:
It is evident that mutual trust can be established in
people with an individualistic orientation through
communication. Communication is likely to be effective
in this area to the extent that the basic features of a
cooperative interrelationship are made explicit in what
is communicated. These basic features are (1) expres-
sion of one's cooperative intention; (2) expression of
one's cooperative expectation; (3) expression of one's
planned reaction to violations of one's expectation; and
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(4) expression of a means of restoring cooperation after
a viclaticn of one's expectation has occurred. [68]
An increase in cooperation should result in moving tovards
the test possible sclution for both sides. This has been
shown to be true in solving Prisoner's Dilemma in experi-
mental studies. Ore way to increase cooperation is to
increase the communication that occurs between the two
sides. This communication can occur at one or more levels
at the same time. The North prefers that any communication
that occurs be dene at the national level. South Korea is
more cpen to the type cf communication that would begin at a
lower level, such as trade and cultural exchanges, and grad-
ually increase to the national level. The hope here is that
an increase in communication would lead to an increase in
trust between the twe sides- At a minimum, it would promote
an increase in understanding and thereby reduce the chance
for irisperception by loth sides.
Even though this phenomena may occur, there is a
pitfall. Increasing communication, and thus cooperation,
means that in moving towards the optimum solution, some kind
cf agreement has to he reached between the two parties in
the conflict. The inherent problem then is; how is this
agreement to be enforced. Unless complete trust on both
sides exists, anything less than a completely binding and
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enforceable agreement would lead back to the same basic
dilemma.
In the Korean situation, the big question would te:
who has the authority to punish or coerce? With the US,PEC,
USSR, and Japan all heavily interested in Korea for their
cwn reasons, and tie inability of the United Nations to
settle the unification issue, this question is difficult to
answer. What is apparent is that: (1) trust becomes a key
factor ir any agreement nc matter how big or small that
occurs between the twe Koreas and; (2) in the absence of a
"policeman" for any agreement, the tension between the sides
must te reduced to alleviate a crisis situation from occur-
ring should a real or perceived deviation from any future
agreement occur by one or both sides.
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In the absence of an established means of communica-
tion the gane can not move towards a cooperative situation.
Ihere is much to be gained by opening communications.
Conversely, there are virtually no negative results involved
for either side. Whether the two sides talk directly or
through a third party is not important initially, although
communicating through an intermediary may ease the domestic
pressures applied to the two governments.
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3. Inc rea sing Trust
Morton Deutsch, states that in a conflict situation
An individual may le said to have trust in the occur-
rence ex an event if he expects its ocurrence and his
expectation leads to behavior which he perceives tc have
greater negative motivational consequences if the expec-
tation is not confirmed than positive motivational
consequences if it is confirmed. [69]
In experimental research of trust and suspicion, Deutsch
utilized the Prisoners Dilemma as a means of testing a
number of hypotheses. Prisoner's Dilemma is a good vehicle
in this type research since the gains and losses incurred by
each person are a function of the choices made by one's
partner as well as those made by oneself.
Some of the findings from the research done by
Deutsch are:
1. There are social situations that, in a sense, do not
allow for the possibility of rational individual
behavior as long as the conditions for mutual trust
do not exist.
2. Mutual trust is most likely to occur when people are
positively oriented to each other's welfare and least
]ikely to occur when they are negatively oriented to
each other's welfare.
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3. Mutual trust can occur even under circumstances in
which the people involved are clearly unconcerned
with each other's welfare, provided that the charac-
teristics of the situation are such that they leal
one to expect one's trust to be fulfilled. Seme of
the situational characteristics that may facilitate
the development of trust appear to be the following:
a) the opportunity for each person to know what the
other perscn will do before he commits himself
irreversibly to a trusting choice.
b) the opportunity and ability to communicate fully a
system for cooperation that defines mutual respon-
sibilities and also specifies a procedure for
handling violations and returning to a state of
itutual cooperation with minimum disadvantage if a
violation cccurs.
c) the power to influence the other person's cutccme
and hence reduce any incentive he may have to
engage in untrustworthy benavior.
d) the presence of a third person whose relationship
to the two players is such that each perceives
that a loss to the ether player is detrimental to
his interests vis a vis the third person. [70 1
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Ey increasing trust between the two Koreas, a posi-
tive increase in cooperation is possible. In order to
accomplish this idea, a third party is almost a necessity.
Through this third party it is possible to gradually create
trust by producing behavioral results which give direct
feedback to the participants [71]. Third party intervention
in which the negotiations of international crises were
conducted by a mutually trusted intermediary have proven
successful. In Korea the use of an intermediary is a possi-
bility since a face to face meeting on substantive issues
has not occurred. One advantage of using an intermediary is
that there is a fallback position for the opponents to which
they could withdraw without directly taking the blame for
their rigid stance [72]. This also allows the adversaries
to disavow the established communication channel at any
given pcint. In doing so the dispute does not grow into an
immediate crisis, but in fact is no worse than before the
third party communication link was established. The role of
the intermediary can be described in this manner.
If outsiders involve themselves in a conflict situation,
the question has been asked in many cases what their
role can be to help promote a settlement. The first
stage is the collection of information and the identifi-
cation of issues; second, insight is needed into the
history and the emctional tone, or affective load of the
conflict; third, alternative positions are explored; and
finally, public opinion must be mobilized. [73]
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As a minimum, a third party could break through the initial
harriers of the conflict and get negotiations started,
therety alleviating the crisis nature of the situation. The
establishment of open communications, as Ambassador Walker
has suggested, is cne of many methods that are possible.
Any amount of joint cooperation will have a positive effect
en the trust between the two countries. While at less than
a full diplomatic level, this "opening of the door" in
economic and cultural areas would help over time to build a
certain degree of trust. Efforts have been made in the past
to establish these small links, but have so far been unsuc-
cessful in building a basis on which increased trust can
grow
.
There is .^ajacther way that third party intervention
can be used to increase trust. The previously discussed use
of a third party is cne in which a symbiotic relationship
existed between the game players and the intervening party.
However, experimental studies by Morton Deutsch and James
Parr have shown that if two people are in the same relation-
ship to a third party, a bond may be established that might
not otherwise exist. Thus "if a subject is in a hostile
relationship to a third person and he perceives that another
person is also in a hostile relationship to the third
person, the subject will develop a friendly relationship
with the other person" ^7^]- Conversely, parallel results
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have teen obtained by Deutsch, Farr, and others that show
the same effect when then relationships with the third party
were friendly rather than hostile. This fact supports the
former suggestion that if a third party intervenes who is in
a symbiotic relationship with both game players, trust can
easily be increased.
























Figure 5.1 Korean Unification Matrix.
Given the matrix structure displayed in figure 5.1,
it is possible that a change in the relative values of the
outcomes for each side may heighten cooperation. It has
been shown that by changing the payoffs of the choices it is
possible to effect a change in the joint-cooperative outcome
(C/C) and the joint-ccmpeti tive outcome (D,D).
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If a significant increase in payoffs to both sides
from cutcome (C,C) were possible, then cocperaticn would
increase. A decrease in the payoffs from outcome (D,D) such
that it would become the least preferred outcome would have
two effects. It would first change the Prisoner's Dilemma
to the game of Chicken*, and would in turn increase
cooperation. [ 75
]
Another way cf increasing cooperation would come
from a modification cf the matrix in such a way that the
possibility of war is decreased. This can be accomplished
in several ways. First, any movement by both sides from
choice (D,D) to choice (C,C) lessens the possibility of war.
Second, by establishing effective communication between the
two sides it becoies less likely that one side might
perceive the payoffs of choice (D,D) and {D,C) or (C,D) as
being equal. Once perceived as being equal there is no
incentive net to take one's first choice, which in this case
is (D). In all liklihood, this would mean war. Third,
through negotiations it is possible to come to an agreement
*The game of Chicken is described in this way: two
drivers in two separate cars are speeding towards each
other. They are both faced with the choice of cooperating
and swerving away at the last moment or in continuing
straight ahead. If cne swerves away and the other does not,
they both live and the player who did not swerve is the
winner. If both swerve, they both live and there is no
winner. If neither swerves away they are both killed and
again there is no winner. Onlike Prisoner's Dilemma, there
is nc reward for mutual cooperation.
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th* t w c u l d dec re as e t^e cha nce °f w a r . In Korea this could
be a formalized Non-Agress ion Pact signed by both parties.
In doing so, the choice by both players of the joint cooper-
ative outcome (C,C) is enhanced. This is true in the sense
that choice (C,C) wculd have a more predictable, positive
outcome than the high risk first preference, (D,C) or (C,D),
of either North or South Korea. The payoffs of choice
(D,D), the status que, would be reduced making it easier for
both sides to cooperate and jointly choose outcome (C,C).
Ihe threat of military intervention by a third party
is another way of modifying the structure of the matrix. In
the case of Korea this is not feasible. The four outside
powers that are involved in the region find it difficult to
act unilaterally due to the constraints placed on them by
their relationships with the other outside actors. It is
possible to see the economic and military power that would
come frcm a united Korea. However, with the interests of
the U.S., USSR, Japan, and the PRC intertwined in Korea, it
would be difficult to affect a change in the existing payeff
structure through third party unilateral intervention. It
is possible that in doing so, since the basic structure of
the game is changed, the chance of hostilities is increased
and if started could easily escalate into international
conf rcntaticn.
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Even if no action by either side is taken the matrix
is modified by the passage of time. There is a possibility
that, as time goes by, values underlying the conflict will
be superseded by new values conducive to cooperative
behavior [76]. If the values do change over time it may be
possible to utilize a third country to increase cooperation
between the North and the South. This would be dore in the
role of mediator in that the third party would assist in
establishing contacts between the two Koreas. It would not
include the threat ct military intervention. Ideas alon-j
these lines have been presented by Richard L. Walker, the
present O.S. Ambassador to the ROK, in a paper presented to
the Symposium on Functional Approaches to Unification in
March 1980. His ideas include using a third country to:
open up dialogue, increase trade by indirect means, and to
help establish open communications between the two Koreas.
£77]
There are, however, negative aspects involved in
viewing time as a vehicle for matrix modification. As time
passes "the status guo (now three decades since the end of
the Korean War) approaches the status of tradition and as
such becomes ever more entrenched and less likely to be
altered" [78].
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5 . Seducing Misggrcegt ions
Studies in game theory nave demonstrated that
perceptions (or mispercept ions) of the opponent and his
strategies play a vital role in a conflict. They are,
however, the one major element that is left out of the tneo-
retical aspect of games. If misperceptions are to be
reduced and the pitfalls they cause eliminated it becomes a
necessary requirement to seek and understand the causes for
misperceptions. Robert Jervis has studied raispercepticn in
international relations in depth and has outlined several
hypotheses concerning their origin [79]. Understanding
these sources of mispercept ion is critical in a case, such
as Korea, where long standing divergent views on reconcilia-
tion have existed. It is complicated by the ideological
differences that separate the two countries. A basis for
real communication can be established and maintained once
the chance of misperception of action or intentions is
reduced. It also aids in establishing trust between the two
parties in the conflict.
Misperceptions are seen as having negative influ-
ences. Player A (South Korea) , for example, may reason that
since North Korea is "bad" and the ROK is "good" it is
rational to choose and stay with its first outcome choice
since the North will certainly stay with their first outcome
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choice. While this may not be true for both sides, it is
difficult tc change these misperceptions for two reasons:
1. perceptions are the result of extended socialization
through the family, the media, the school, religicus
institutions, and the military service,
2. in a conflict situation, perceptions become more
pclarized due to a moral self image and military
overconf idence. [80]
The longer the two Koreas remain apart, the greater
influence socialization will have on both societies.
Iikewise / increased polarization is likely to occur as time
passes. It then appears that the longer the separation the
greater the likelihood that misperceptions will be main-
tained by both sides. This can be reduced by just opening
effective communica ticn between the two, then by increasing
the trust each has of the other.
6 . Mod ify ing Strategy
The basis for this idea lies in increasing coopera-
tion for one side by nanipulating the strategy of the ether
player. As Lumsden determined in the Cyprus case: applying
this approach in the real world entails persuading one (or
both) parties tc adept a more cooperative strategy. This
may be easier to do as a member of a nation in conflict than
as an outsider. [81] Lumsden uses the Graduated
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Recip location in Tension Reduction (GRIT) strategy of
President Kennedy as an example of how this could he done.
In modifying a player's strategy, one assumes that they
desire increased cooperation. One must also assume that the
relative weights (power) of the players are equal. This
situation of eguality is known as a symmetric game.
However, if an assymmetric game exists (one player stronger
relative to the ether), then this approach is not as appli-
cable. Ihe idea of game symmetry will be discussed later.
Militarily, the two Koreas are more equal now than
at any previous time. Thus a modification of strategy by
one cr both sides is, for the present time, a viable option.
Strategy modification would involve one side taking a new
approach to the current conflict of interests that is
inherent in the situation- As with the GRIT strategy, if
the ECK were, as an example, to unilaterally decrease the
size of its armed forces it would be a basic change in their
approach to unification. Knowing that other strategies have
not been successful, this reduction would be done in order
to extract a similar concession form the North, cr as a
minimuii to demonstrate sincerity in wanting to negotiate.
Ihe question of perception comes to the forefront
again in the area of attempting to modify a players
strategy. There exists the possibility that the intention
of one side, however sincere, in modifying its strategy may
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he perceived as devicus behavior intended to undermine the
opponent. However, thorough knowledge of the sources of
misperception as outlined by Jervis and an understanding cf
the rcle they play in a conflict will help to avoid negative
effects en strategy modification. Knowing that irispercep-
tions do occur , along with the fact that strategy modifica-
tion cannot readily be achieved by outside influence as
easily as a member of the conflict, will make strategy modi-
fication by one side or the other difficult but not impos-
sible. It most likely can be used to aid in the
establishment of serious communication between the two
Koreas on the unification issue.
7. Mod ify ing the Rule s of the Game
As lumsden states:
the structure cf a game is defined by the rules, which
define the choices available to each player, the
payoffs, and the identity of the players. If the rules
are changed, behavior may also be changed. In the real
world, however, it is frequently the rules of the game
which are disputed. [82]
This idea has at its core changing the values (payeffs)
obtained frcm the possible choices for each player. Another
possible way to modify the game's rules would be to develop
one or more new choices (outcomes) that would have the same
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cr greater payoff as each sides first or second choices.
For example: is there a political system that would satisfy
the needs of both North and South Korea in a confederated
unification, or as a minimum insure peace between them? Or,
is it possible to scmehow formalize the status quo? 3y
doing so, formal recognition of each side by the other could
occur. This would provide for an effective means of commu-
nication that could then work for a final solution. It car-
te assumed that once this action is taken a reduction in
tension tetween the parties in the conflict would occur.
within the area of strategy modification a chance
for progress on the unification issue exists. How to do it
is ancther question. In this instance, help from a third
party would be extemely beneficial. The key is to redefine
the rules so that both sides can agree to a mutually optical
solution. In theory it sounds easy. In practice it would be
a difficult and risky process.
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v*« UNIFICATION AS 4 COOPEHATIVE GAMS
At the outset, the Korean unification issue was
described as a two-person non cooperative variable sum gaire.
In particular the situation has been described in terms of a
Prisoner's Dilemma. The game thus far has been seen in the
context cf basically no communication ocurring between the
sides. The last section described ways in which it is
possible to modify the non-cooperative nature of the game.
The key area, however, is communication. Once effective
communca tior. is established it is possible to utilize the
ether ways cf further modifying the matrix, thereby changing
the situation to a cccperative form of two-person game.
From this point en, the ideas outlined can constitute
the basis for strategies by which movement towards a solu-
tion are possible. It is then assumed that at this point
on, that the Prisoner's Dilemma becomes a cooperative game.
In terms of Korean unification, the game would not move from
a non-cooperative gane to a cooperative game unless seme
action is taken by both sides in the conflict to change the
status quo. The change does not have to be an immediate
move to the joint cooperative {C,C) outcome. An examination
of Figure 6.1 will re-weal why. The graph shown represents
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the paycff matrix for Korean unification as it currently
exists. As in the matrix representation of the situation,
exact nuibers are not assigned to the payoffs. , Once again,
I
PU
— h — — security level
Figure 6. 1 Korean Unification Bargaining Space.
it is the relative values of the payoffs that are important.
The payoffs that each side might conceivably ottain from
eacn of the four given outcomes can be explained as follows:
1. point SQ, the status <^uo, shows that both North and
South Korea are deriving positive payoffs. However,
Scuth Korea is getting a lesser amount of payoffs
than it would receive from its first choice (DU) or
from peaceful unification (FU) . North Korea is
getting less payoffs than it would from its first
choice (CU) or peaceful unification (PO).
2. the amount of payoffs for South Korea at point (EU)
are less than they would be at point (PU) .
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3. the amount of payoffs that North Korea would get from
point (CU) are less than they would Le at point (PU).
4. point (PO), peaceful unification will allow the
greatest amount of payoffs for both players.
The security level is defined by the lines from the SQ to
points a and b. Line SQ-a is the security level foi the
North and line SQ-b is the security level for the South.
This line represents the level at which the payoffs begin to
be less than they are at point SQ. Thus, if one player
begins to receive payoffs that are less than they derive
from the status guo, there no longer is an incentive to stay
with the status guo. In terms of Prisoner's Dilemma, it
would be the point at which the choice to defect, or take
one's first choice, appears to be the prudent course of
action. In such a case, a war is the likely outcome.
Given the graphic representation of the relative payoff
structure and the fact that a cooperative situation exists,
the scluticn to the game then becomes a bargaining prctlem.
The possible set of solutions to the game can be shown to
lie in the area bounded by points a, PU, b, and SQ. This
area is known as the bargaining space. Thus, the number of
solutions is virtually infinite. One must distinguish,
however, between interim and the final solution. An interim
solution is one in which the payoffs gained by both sides
lie within the bargaining space. This assumes a negotiated
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agreement has occurred that benefits both sides. There are
possible solutions that lie cutside the bargaining space,
tut whose results would in all probability be disastrous.
The optimum final solution is, of course, represented by
point PU. However, any solution within the bargaining space
can be the final solution if agreed to by both sides. Ihe
important fact to remember is that it is not necessary to
move directly from SQ to PLJ. Any agreement, whether interim
or final, that nets a greater amount of payoffs for both
sides than the status quo will have a positive result or. the
conflict.
Prior to engaging in the play of the cooperative game it
is necessary to understand several factors that impact on
the play of the cooperative game. They are all factors that
can have adverse effects on the final outcome of the game.
However, like misperception, if their role in the game is
understood prior to playing the game, their effects can be
minimized. The cooperative form of the game begins a
bargaining situation in which both parties will try to
maximize their gains and minimize their losses. Volumes
have teen written on the subject of bargaining and negotia-
tion. One could net possibly cover all the aspects of
bargaining theory as they might apply to this game. There
are however a few important factors that can affect the game
at this point. It is to the advantage of both players to
have knew how they can affect the play of the game.
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A. TEE EFFECTS OF INTERDEPENDENCE ON COOPERATION AND
COMPETITION
Morton Deutsch, a pioneer in game theory, has developed
a set of concepts that descrite the effects of interdepen-
dence en competition and cooperation. Deutsch describes a
cooperative situation as one in which the goals of the
participants are so linked that any participant can attain
his goal if, and only if, the others with whom he is linked
can attain their goals. They are "promotively interdepen-
dent" in that ther-e is a positive correlation between the
attainments of the two players. A competetive situation is
one in which the goals for the players are "contriently
interdependent", that is there is a negative correlation
between their goal attainments. [83] The effects of interde-
pendence en cooperation and competition are shown in Tables
One and Two [84]. Deutsch states that these tables present
in a condensed outline form some of the basic ideas involved
in his analysis of the effect of cooperation and
competition.
In essence, the theory states that the effects of one
person's actions upon another will be a function of the
nature of their ' interdependence and the nature of the
action that takes place. Skillfully executed actions of
an antagonist will elicit rather different responses
than skillful actions from an ally, but a bumbling coor-
dinator may evoke as much negative reaction as an adroit
opponent. The theory links the type of interdependence
and type of action with three basic social- psychological
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processes- which I have labeled "substitutibility"
,
"cathexis", and " inducibi lit
y
M
- and it then proliferates
a variety of social-psychological consequences from
these processes as they are affected by the variables
with which the thecry is concerned. [85]
Eeutsch defines these three processes in this manner:
1. substitutibility- the willingness to allow someone
else's actions to be sutstitutable for one's own,
2. cathexis- the development of positive or negative
attitudes,
3. inducibility- the readiness to be influenced posi-
tively by another. [86]
By examining column , C I in Tables 1 and 2 one can see that
in order to settle a bargaining situation, the two players
would have to be operating in the cooperative environment of
Table 1. In fact, the two Koreas appear to be in parts of
both the competitive and the cooperative environments. In
order to settle the unification issue, interdependence
hetween North and South Korea will have to be of the fully
cooperative nature shewn in Table 1. Further, the actions
taken by either side in an effort to cooperate will have to
be of the "effective" type as shown in column ' B f of latle
1. The move towards a fully cooperative situation can be
enhanced by any means that highlight mutual interests.
However, the past and current situations in Korea on unifi-
cation have been and are increasingly competetive. Deutsch
11 1
cites such things as: attempts to reduce the other player's
power; suspicious, hostile, exploitive attitudes; the magni-
fication of opposed interests; using factors of threat,
intimidaticn, or coercion; devious communication; and espio-
nage as means of increasing the competetive relationship.
Many of these factors exist in the relationship between the
two Koreas.
E. TBE EFFECTS CF SYMMETRY
An asymmetric structure has effects on two parts of the
game. First, the relative bargaining power of the two
parties involved will have a profound effect on the outcome.
In the situation of the two Koreas, such things as economic
power, political stability, military power, and the sociali-
zation process must be taken into account in determining the
power of each side relative to the other. For example, if
one side has a much greater military strength it should be
able, by means of a threat to use its military power, to
have the situation settled in a way that is closer to its
own most desired outcome. This outcome would be farther
from the opponents most desired outcome and might, depending
on the f€ar of the threat, be closer to the opponents worst
outcome.
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Asymmetry can also affect the payoff structure of the
game. If, for example, the payoffs of a given outcome were
significantly greater for one side than they were for the
ether, the side with expectations of a greater outcome would
be more willing to settle than the side that would receive a
smaller payoff from that same outcome. One would then see a
situation where the relative payoffs would become more
important than the outcome itself. In this situation, there
would be a significant decrease in cooperative behavior. A
study has shown that:
one interpretation cf the obtained differences in coop-
eration in the asymmetric game condition is that the
subject's concern centered around relative outcome
rather than personal gain and consequently the only
option available to the low reward subjects was to avoid
cooperative play, thereby minimizing other's actual
outcomes. [87 ]
This then becomes another reason that the situation needs to
begin acvement towards a settlement now. In the future,
South Korea will become ever more economically powerful than
the North. Thus asymmetry enters the game and as time
passes the South will be less willing to settle the situ-
ation as the payoffs received from the status guo increase.
At the same time, the payoffs from a peaceful unification
are likely to be perceived by the South as being less than
they are now, in relative terms, given the turmoil of mixing
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the two economies shculd unification occur. This would also
mean that the payoffs for the status quo and the South's
first choice (democratic unification) would be growing
closer to the same, at least in economic terms. If they are
perceived as being the same, then the situation becomes
unstable since there would be less incentive to stay with
the status quo. If this were to be combined with a military
advantage by the South at some point in the future, the
results could be disastrous.
C. TEH21ATIOH AHD TBEEAT
One tasic premise of Prisoner's Dilemma is that each
player is tempted tc doublecross the other to obtain an
immediate larger gain for himself, or to maximize his gain
relative to the other, cr to protect himself from the
possible treachery of the other [88]. While this is true,
each flayer is also kept from defecting by the fear of
retaliation from the other side. Whether a player demon-
strates cooperative behavior or not is dependent on the size
of the payoffs he is liable to receive from the four
outcomes [89]. In the case of Korea, if the payoffs for cne
side were to change in a large way for one or more of the
given outcomes, then the chances of non-cooperative behavior
(defection) are increased. In figure 5.1, all the outcomes
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except fcr (A1,B1) have inherent in tnem the possiblity of a
war. We cculd surmise, for example, if the paycffs for
North Korea of the status guo and a communist led government
were to become nearly the same, then North Korea would be
tempted to defect and would take the steps necessary to
acheive its most desired outcome. Even if no action were
taken on its part, the threat of action could cause the
ether side to settle. This assumes, of course, that the
South would perceive the North's payoffs for the two
outcomes the same way as the North does. Whether this
happened would depend on the relative costs of defecting as
compared to the relative payoffs. One other thing to keep
in mind is that as lecg as the payoffs of the status guo are
greater than those of the two sides first choices, then it
is likely that there is where the situation will remain.
That is, unless the payoffs of joint cooperation can be
increased in real terms for both sides in the conflict, or
both sides see that it is in their best interest to begin
ttovement towards the cooperative solution.
D. POSITION AND IHAGE LOSS
Once communication and bargaining begin, relative posi-
tion and less of image enter the situation. This is where
the "personalities" cf the two Koreas come into play. Since
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the two flayers in this situation are governments it is much
more ccmclicated than dealing in the simple situation cf two
individual players. However, some of the same principles
still apfly. The majcr factors involved in this area are:
1. bargainers are reluctant to make concessions lest
they be made tc look foclish or weak,
2. subjects will be motivated to do better than their
adversary, even at the risk of not reaching an agree-
ment
,
3. participants in a first or one-time only bargaining
exchanges are likely to be less sensitive to the
iiage loss implications of their concession than are
the participants in repeated encounters cr ir. an
ongoing r eLa4J.cn shi p , . •
4. bargainers in ar ongoing relationship are more likely
tc discriminate among various levels of appearance
and to be particulary sensitive to the loss cf image
associated with low- level concessions- perhaps
because such concessions are regarded as setting a
dangerous precedent that invites higher-level conces-
sions at a later time. [90]
When one applies the decision making process in each of the
countries to the bargaining process it is easy to see how
the loss of image and position vis a vis the other party is
important. Internal political realities make image loss
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important. As has been stated, as time passes it will
become increasingly difficult for concessions to be made by
either side on the urification issue. Even if one side made
a concession, the prctlem of how the other side would inter-
pret it comes into play. No matter how sincere the proposal
or concession, it might be interpreted as a scheme to under-
mine the position cf the opposing side and therefore
rejected. Given that the there are perceived domestic
restraints preventing action by the two governments, a bcld
initiative by one side or the other is necessary. likewise
it is important that once the initiative is made the ether
player accept it. Eoth sides' in the conflict have a common
enemy, time. The passage of time not only brings further
socialization of the status quo but also will .bring a gener-
ation that does not rememner having lived in a united Kcrea.
In toth the cooperative and non-cooperative games
discussed above, it must be remembered that all of these
factors inherent in both types of games are at work on the
situation at all times. It is difficult to isolate one
factor and deal with it. Even if it could be done, these
factors have a certain amount of interdependence. Action on
one of them causes reactions in the others. What is obvious
is the fact that the only solution to the problem lies in
increasing cooperation between the two parties.
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VII. NEGOTIATING SUCCESSFULLY IN A COOPERATIVE GAME
Negotiations are bat one of many means available to
resolve conflicts. They will however, be a central factor
in any peaceful solution to the Korean unification problem.
Bargaining and negotiation are in fact a subset of the
larger area of game theory. They become important in
resolving any cooperative non zero sum game; in this
instance, the Prisoner's Dilemma.
Before discussing a new approach to bargaining, one must
have a clear idea or definition of the term. According to
Fred C. Ikle, two prerequisites are necessary _in crder for
negotiations to take place. First, there must be common
interests between the parties. Second, there must be issues
of conflict. Without common interests there is nothing to
negotiate for, tiithcut conflict there is nothing to nego-
tiate about. [9 1] In Korea, one must assume that there are
common interests between the North and the South. If they
do not exist, then finding a solution other than the status
quo will be extremely difficult. There are certainly many
points of conflict between the two countries about which
negotiations can take place. The Korean unification issue
meets both of Ikle's prerequisites for negotiating.
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Ixle formally defines negotiation as: the process in
which explicit proposals are put forward ostensibly for the
purpose of reaching agreement on an exchange or on the real-
ization cf a common interest where conflicting interests are
present. Frequently, these proposals deal not only with the
terms of agreement but also with the topics to be discussed
(the agenda) , with the ground rules that ought to apply and
with the underlying technical and legal issues [92]. With
this ir Bind* the discussion can now move to a new approach
to bargaining which, if followed, will make any future
discussions between the North and the South more productive.
Up to this point the stalemated unification situation in
Korea has been explained in terms of game theory. This has
been done in order to gain a better understanding of the
situation. Game theory, specifically the Prisoner's Dilemma
model, has been used to explain why the situation continues
to exist, the factors that have an effect on the "game", and
a number of possible methods through which it is possible to
move towards a solution of the issue. Chapter 3 explained
the existing situation in terms of a two person non zero sum
non cooperative game. Chapter 5 explained a number of
factors that could cause the situation to change from its
non-cooperative form to a cooperative two person non zero
sum game. In this chapter it is assumed that a move by both
North and South Korea has been made such that both agree to
substantive discussions in a effort to solve the situation.
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The two times that the Nortu and the South agreed to
talk formally about unification, 1972 and 1979, the discus-
sions failed prior tc any substantive talks on the unifi-
cation issue. Thus, should the two Koreas again find
themselves in such a situation, a new method of negotiation
that has a higher probability of success should be used.
Such a method is outlined by Robert Fisher and William Ury
in their book, Getting to Yes: Ne jotia ting an Agreement
Ei£hout Giving In. What follows is a brief summary of
Fisher and Ury • s ideas and an application of those ideas to
the Kcrean unification problem.
1 • Pri nci pled Nego tiat ion
According to Fisher and Ury, the majority of people
in the world see basically two ways to negotiate; hard and
soft. Cn one hand the soft bargainer tries to settle the
conflict in such a way that he is likely to give concessions
easily. More often than not this ends uo with the soft
bargainer being taken advantage of since he will sacrifice
some of his interests in order to simply reach an agreement.
Conversely, the hard bargainer will not make any concessions
for fear of an agreement in which he has to compromise his
interests. In such a case, the negotiations are likely to
drag on a very long time thus allowing frustration and
hatred to enter between the parties who are negotiating.
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Fisher and Ury state that there is a third method of negoti-
ation which comes between soft and hard negotiating styles
and which in the lcng run is more likely to produce a
lasting solution that leaves the relationsnip between the
negotiating parties intact. They call this method "princi-
pled negotiation".
The method of principled negotiation is to decide issues
on their merits rather than through a haggling process
focused on what each side says it will and will net do.
It suggests that you look for mutual gains wherever
possible, and that where interests conflict, you should
insist that the result be based on some fair standards
independent of the will of either side. The method of
principled negotiation is hard on merits, soft en the
people. It employs no tricks and no posturing.
Principled negotiation shows you how to obtain what you
are entitled to and still be decent. It enables you to
be fair while protecting you against those who would
take advantage of your fairness. [93]
Eoth North and South Korea have been hard bargainers
on the urification issue since 1950. Neither side has been
willing to make any concession. Therefore the relationship
between the two has not improved any in thirty years.
Principled negotiation will provide the best chance for the
two Koreas to begin to move from the status guo to a solu-
tion of the unification problem. What is certain is that a
continuation of the existing situation is not in the inter-
ests of either of the two sides. As long as toth sides
bargain from firm "positions", a solution is unlikely.
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2- The Problem: Positional Bar gain ing
Fisher and Ury state that any metnod of negotiation
should t€ judged on three criteria. It should produce a
wise agreement if agreement is possible, it should be effi-
cient, and it should improve or at least not damage the
relationship between the parties [94]. It is extremely
important that the relationship between the two Koreas get
no worse than it is today. A decline in the current rela-
tionship can only mean a resulting increase in tensions
between the two and an increased chance of hostilities
breaking out.
According to Fisher and Ury, positional bargaining
produces unwise agreenents, is not efficient and endangers
the long term relationship between the two parties. The
following points illustrate their ideas:
1. When negotiators bargain over positions, they tend to
lock themselves into those positions. The more you
clarify your position and defend it against attack,
the more committed you become to it.
2. As mere attention is paid to positions, less atten-
tion is devoted to meeting the underlying concerns of
the parties. Any agreement reached may reflect a
mechanical splitting of the difference between final
positions rather than a solution carefully crafted to
meet the legitimate interests of the parties.
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3. Bargaining over positions creates incentives that
stall settlement. In positional bargaining you try
tc improve the chance that any settlement reached is
favorable to you by starting with an extreme posi-
tion, holding to that position, deceiving your oppo-
nent as to ycur true views, and by possibly making
small concessions in order to keep the negotiations
going. All this increases the time and costs of
reaching agreement as well as the risk that no agree-
ment will be reached at all.
4. Positional bargaining becomes a contest of will.
Each side tries through sheer power to force the
other side to change its position. Thus it strains
and sometimes shatters the relationship between the
parties
.
5. When there are many parties involved in the situ-
ation, positional bargaining is even worse. In such
situations, it leads to the formation of coalitions
among parties whose shared interests are often more
symbolic than substantive. What is worse, once the
coalitions have agreed upon a position, it becomes
much harder to change it since it requires the
consent of the group. [95]
This last point is important when considering the role of
the four major powers and their effect on the unification
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issue. They at present are net providing any assistance or
support to either side on this issue. None of them sees
unification as being in their short term interests. Thus,
the initiation of a move towards unification will have to
come ficm inside Korea itself.
In order to get around positional bargaining, Fisher
and Ury have developed the method of principled negotiation.
It can tasically be summed up in four points: separate the
people ficm the problem, focus on interests not positions,
invent options for mutual gain, and insist that the result
be based en some objective standard.
a. Separate the People from the Problem
Human beings have many faults. They are not the
most ideal vehicle that one couxd imagine to be used to
settle conflicts. It is impossible for humans to separate
themselves from their feelings and emotions. Thus, percep-
tions of the other sides intentions and the the communica-
tion of one's own ideas becomes difficult. According to
fisher and Ury taking positions in a negotiation makes this
worse because people's egos become identified with their
positions. The "people problem should be dealt with as an
issue separate from the substantive problem. The partici-
pants must come to see themselves as working together on the
problem and not attacking each other" [96]. In crder to
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deal with the "people problem" as a separate issue aside
from the main issue, Fisher and Ury suggest that there are
three categories of problems that must be solved. The first
is perception. The effects of this area have previously
been discussed. However, the following ways are described
by Fisher and Ury in order to help eliminate perception of
the ether party as being a problem:
1. put yourself ir their shoes,
2. don't deduce their intentions from your fears,
3. don't blame them for your problem,
4. discuss each other's perceptions,
5. look for opportunities to act consistently with their
perceptions,
6. give them a stake in the outcome by, making sure they
participate in the process,
7. make your proposals consistent with their values
[97].
The second area is emotions. No matter how hard
one tries, emotions have an inate ability to pervade the
negotiatior process and destroy it. This involves not only
the personal emotions of the negotiators, but also the
national emotions felt by the members of a country and
applied as public pressure to the negotiators. To reduce
the effects emotions have on negotiations Fisher and Ury
would apply these factors to the problem:
125
1. recognize and understand emotions, theirs and yours,
2. make emotions explicit and acknowledge them as legit-
imate,
3. allow the other side to let off steam,
4. don't react to emotional outbursts,
5. use symbolic gestures that produce a constructive
emotional impact on the other side [98].
The third area is communication. Bargaining
cannot exist in the absence of communication. The impor-
tance of this one area to the overall process of conflict
resolution cannot be understated. It is the single most
important factor in the negotiations. There are three big
problems in communication. First, negotiators may not be
talking to each other in a way which is understood. Second,
even if you are talking to the other side directly, they may
not be hearing ycu. Third, misunderstanding a given commu-
nication is possible through misinterpretation. £99] In
order to nininiize this problem one must:
1. listen actively and acknowledge what is being said,
2. speak to be understood,
3. speak about yourself, not about them,
4. speak for a purpose [TOO].
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h. Focus on Interests Not Positions
According to Fisher and Jry, if a negotiation
focuses on positions, the ensuing agreement will necessarily
satisfy the human needs of either side that led them to take
their position in the first £iace. In other words, the
interests of both sides are not best served in such an
agreement. They use this anecdote to illustrate satisfying
what at first are irreconcilable positions in such a way
that hcth parties actual in terests are best served.
Consider the story cf two men quarrelling in a litrary.
One wants the windcw open and the other wants it closed.
They bicker back and forth about how much to leave it
open: a crack, halfway, three quarters of the way. No
solutions satisfies them both. Enter the librarian.
She asks one why he wants the window open: "To get some
fresh air". She asks the other one why he wants it
closed: To avoid the draft". After thinking a linute,
she opens wide a window in the next room, bringing in
fresh air without a draft. [101
J
This classically illustrates the idea of bargaining from
positions and shows the problems involved in doing so.
Positional bargaining does not meet the definition of nego-
tiations as defined by Fred Ikle: the process in which
explicit proposals are put forward ostensibly for the
purpose of reaching agreement en an exchange or on the real-
ization cf a common interest where conflicting interests are
present [102].
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What then defines the problem; the difference
between the negotiating positions or the conflict between
each side's needs, desires, concerns, and fears? As Fisher
and Ury state, the interests of the two sides define the
problem and not the positional differences between them.
What must be done is to (1) identify the interests cf bcth
parties, and (2) discuss the interests of both parties in
order to reach an agreement that satisfies the needs of both
sides. This, net splitting the difference between
bargaining positions, will provide an agreement that will be
meaningful and will not harm the long term relationship
between the negotiating parties.
c. Invent Options for Mutual Gain
Once principled negotiation is started, the
options available to each side, theoretically, are
increased. The parties are no longer locked into two
opposing positions from which and about which to negotiate.
If both sides see that the problem lies in the difference of
interests and not in the difference of their positions, a
wide range of subjects about which negotiations can ocuur
becomes available. The problem then becomes. one of hew to
reach an agreement such that the actual interests of bcth
parties are met. To do so, Fisher and Ury suggest inventing
a wide range of options that will allow for the maximum
amount of gains for bcth parties. This can be done by:
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1. separating the act of inventing options from the act
of judging then,
2. broadening the options on the table rather than
locking for a single answer,
3. searching for irutual gains,
4. inventing ways of making the decisions easy for both
sides [ 103].
If these suggestions are utilized, the negotiating parties
can ccme to the realization that the situation is not a zero
sum game. The solution to the situation does not neces-
sarily lie on the straight line between the two sides nego-
tiating positions. Ihere are in fact many mutual interests
involved. The key is to insure that the actual interests of
both sides are met. 5 worthwhile, lasting agreement is to
be judged by this, net merely on the fact that an agreement
was reached.
d. Insist on Objective Criteria
In attempting to solve the problem between the
negotiating parties, there will at some point be interests
that conflict. Once the shared interests have been recog-
nized, the conflicting interests must.be discussed. Again,
positional bargaining will prove to be a hinderance in
reaching an agreement. To solve this problem, Fisher and
Ury suggest the use of objective criteria in working out the
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differences between the parties. Another of their examples
illustrates this point.
Suppose that you have entered into a fixed-price
construction contract for your house that calls for
reinforced concrete foundations but fails to specify how
deep they should be. The contractor suggests two feet.
You think that five feet is closer to the usual depth
for your type house. Now suppose the contractor ways:
"I went along with you on steel girders for the roof.
It's your turn to gc along with me on shallower founda-
tions". No owner in his right mind would yield. Rather
than horse-trade, ycu would insist on deciding the issue
in terms of objective safety standards. [104]
As lcng as objective standards can be applied to the
conflicting interests, an agreement can be reached. This
agreement may not fully meet the interests of both parties.
But in the instance where there must be compromise it is
based on facts that tcth parties have agreed to in an objec-
tive manner and leaves both sides feeling that they have
won, not lost. . They also understand the objective reasons
why the compromise was necessary.
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS
The discussions in this thesis have utilized game and
bargaining theory as a means of understanding the problem of
Korean unification. Through the use of game theory, a theo-
retical nod el of the current situation in Korea was estab-
lished. It was shown that there is a correlation of that
situation and the Prisoner's Dilemma game. In chapter 1
,
the author stated that the rational approach to game theory
is useful in a number of areas. The two areas that this
thesis discussed were:
1. the rational approach to game theory is useful for
explanation of people's behavior (in situations which
their behavior exhibit high degrees of rationality
and therefore admits an explanation in terms of a
rationalistic theory) and,
2. game theory in this rationally defined situation can
provide for strategy recommendations for the various
participants.
Given the definition of rationality developed by Karch
and Simon and the application of that definition tc Korean
unification, it has been possible to explain the behavior of
the two Koreas. This has been done in order to gain an
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understanding of the situation/ the reasons the situation
continues to exist, and to see how the behavior exhirited
over the last thirty years can be modified.
With an understanding of the situation and the factors
that affect the situation, it is possible to provide
strategy recommendations to the players. Korean unification
has been defined as a Prisoner's Dilemma game. It is pres-
ently a two person non zero sum, non-cooperative game. The
strategy recommendations provide the means necessary to
change the game from its non-cooperative form to a fully
cooperative type of two person game. Unless the game is
changed to a cooperative form a solution is highly unlikely.
Cne important point to remember is that the choices of
possible solutions are not limited to the four options that
define the Prisoner's Dilemma. There exists a set cf solu-
tions that are bounded by these four solutions. Movement
from the status guo to any solution within the solution set
(bargaining space, p. 108) will leave both players better off
than they are in the status ^uo. The seven ways that will
change the structure of the game to the cooperative form
are:
1. displaying the matrix,
2. increasing communication,
3. increasing trust
4. modifying the matrix,
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5. reducing misp exceptions
,
6. modifying strategy,
7. modifying the rules of the game.
The structure of the game has been defined and the
strategies necessary to change the problem from a non-
cooperative to a cooperative form of conflict have been
described. It is ir the cooperative form of conflicts that
solutions can be negotiated. In this environment the ideas
of "principled negotiation" as described by Fisher and Ury
can be utilized to work out an agreement.
Eesides gaining a better understanding of the situation
and an idea of some of the strategies involved in solving
the gaire, there are ether significant conclusions that can
be drawn from the gane theoretical model as it applies to
Korean unification. First, the time for the two Koreas to
act is now. The game as defined by the model is at present
symmetric. The symmetry exists due to the relative balance
of military power. However, as time passes the South will
continue to increase the economic disparity that exists
between the itself and the North. The South's military
capability is also likely to continue to grow. Their arms
industry that was started in the early 1970's is growing and
is providing almost all the military equipment needed by the
EOK. Additionally, as time passes there will be a genera-
tion of Koreans who do not ever remember having lived in a
133
united country. This may have a profound effect on ^ojular
suppcit for unification. Thus, one could conclude that
increased socialization of the situation will tend to make
the division of the two countries more concrete. If this
occurs, the best possible solution might be to formalize the
status q\io
.
Second, the key factor in solving the dilemma is
increasing cooperation. Conversely/ any efforts that
decrease the possibility of defection will also have posi-
tive results. fihat then is the best strategy to entice the
players into cooperative behavior? The crucial factor is
the social-psychological relationship of the participants,
i.e., their initial attitudes toward each other and their
experience as the game progresses [105]. As Morton Deutsch
has said, players rate a cooperative partner more favorably
on his motives and on his personality traits than a competi-
tive opponent and react more strongly to his signals (Tatles
1 and 2, Chapter 6). Likewise, if a player acts non-
cooperatively, the opponent will be viewed in a negative
light and will be blamed for the conflict course. The best
strategy to achieve mutual cooperation is a tit-for-tat
strategy which results in a increase of. cooperative moves on
both sides. Previous competitive plays strengthen the coop-
erative interaction in subsequent games [106]. The success
of this strategy requires one of the players to make an
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initial told gesture that is subsequently accepted by the
other player.
Third, interaction determines to a considerable degree
the performance of the individual participant. Socially
rigid players behaved more cooperatively when they inter-
acted with socially open minded players: on the other hand,
the latter acted less cooperatively in playing against the
former. What is remarkable is the finding that of an
overall gain in cooperative behavior, since the rigid
players increased more in cooperative performance than the
open-minded ones lost [107], Based on tnis, one key ques-
tion asked by the South can be answered. How does one get
the North to exhibit more cooperative behavior and thus be
willing to negotiate? The latter discussion leads one to
believe that flexible cooperative attitudes will lead to a
modification of the provocative nature or agressive inclina-
tion on the side of even the most rigid adversary. Any move
by one side that elicits a cooperative response from the
ether side will have a positive effect on the game. The
most notable effect will be a lessening of tensions on the
Korean peninsula. In an environment with less tension the
chances of conflict are reduced. This in turn is likely to
further increase the cooperative nature of the two parties
involved in the conflict. In such an environment, trust is
likely to increase, communication will be increased, and the
chance for mis perception by the players reduced.
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Fourth, any move towards unification will have to be
done by the Koreans themselves. This however, involves one
important assumption; the two Korean governments really want
unification and are willing to work toward that goal. It is
possible that both governments are unwilling to seriously
move in such a direction for fear of undermining their
present political power. If this is true there is indeed
little hope for the unification of the Korean peninsula.
For the purpose of this study it has been assumed that the
governments are sincere. Any move towards unification will
have to be internal at least in the initial stages. The
four major outside powers while professing support for
unification neither want it, for their own selfish reasons,
nor would be willing to initiate any actioij^hat might lead
to unification. Once action towards unification has been
started, either internally or externally, the four powers
can positively and negatively influence the outcome. The
extent of support or non-support for a unification initia-
tive by the four powers has infinite possibilities and its
effects are unknown in the absence of an actual scenario.
The two Koreas must take this into account before venturing
towards unification. This does not rule out the use of a
third party in the process of unification once started by
the two Koreas. To be useful the third party would have to
be a disinterested party to the situation and would have to
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be agreed upon by the conflicting parties. As was discussed
earlier, this third party could prove invaluable in the
initial stages of dialogue between the two Koreas as an aid
in establishing communication and building trust. The
influence of a mediator has been explained by Jerome Podeli
and William Knapp:
experimental studies have shown that tne clearest prcof
of the importance cf mediation results from a game in
which the identical offer for a compromise settlement
was sutmitted by tie spokesman for the one party and by
the impartial mediator; the first was rejected as unnac-
ceptable, while the mediated version was accepted. Thus
mediation can open a path to a mutually satisfactory
agreement that would portend more cooperative behavior
in the future. [ 108
'
None of the four major powers cou^d^ be a successful medi-
ator. The choice of the mediator would have to be agreed
upon by the two Koreas and would have to be a nation or
organization that would be willing to take on the task.
Fifth, the status quo in Korea, as discussed earlier in
this thesis, is not a status quo at ail. The existing situ-
ation is constantly changing and evolving. The South is
getting increasingly stronger economically and militarily.
They have surpassed, in economic terms, the ability of the
North to compete in world markets. This gap is likely to
widen as time passes. Thus, the status quo can only be
defined by a short period of time. The status quo today is
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mucn different than the status quo that existed in 1960 or
1970. Th€ cne ccmmoc factor in all of these time periods is
that two national governments and two nations have existed.
At seme point the twe Korean governments will have tc chocse
from among the possible options that are available. ^Ihese
options may not lead to the unification of the peninsula.
If as Nathan White suggests, the two Koreas do cot want
unification based on the possible solutions outlined by the
Prisoner's Dilemma game described in this thesis, then
alternative solutions must be eagerly sought [109]. Cne
possible scenario is the initial formalization of the status
quo, meaning two independent Korean nations recognized by
each ether and the four powers, economic exchanges that
allow for the development of the North Korean economy, and
normalization of relations between the two Korean nations.
This would have a tendency to reduce the tension on the
peninsula, but as Nathan White suggests would not eliminate
totally the chance of hostilities occurring. In this envi-
ronment, the political interests of the elites in the North
and the South are preserved while allowing for negotiations
to occur that would work towards an eventual unification.
This scenario may be necessary in the long term. Anyone who
believes that unification is likely to occur quickly is
mistaken. Any moves towards unification must, however, be
done in a cooperative environment. This scenario could
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provide for that cooperative environment. As was stated
early in this thesis, the two Koreas do not have to move
directly to a final solution to the unification problem. It
can he dene in stages that will allow for a reduction of the
tension, a lessened chance for hostilities, and in a cooper-
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APPENDIX A
CHEONOLCGY CI KOREAN UNIFICATION 1945-1982
August 15, 194 5
—
Korea was liberated from Japanese rule and divided
two military zcnes-the Soviet forces controlling
area north of
area south.





The U.S. -Soviet joint Committee held
to discuss ways to unify Korea but




i n d e
.
session
; i n it ' € 1 v
May 21, 194 7—
The second session of the U.S. -Soviet Joint
opened. It was adjourned on October 13, 1947.
Commit tee
Novemler 14,1947—
The United Nations General Assembly passed a
calling for general elections throughout




The United N-ations Temporary Commission on Korea
arrived in Seoul to supervise general elections. The
Soviet occupation authorities north of the demarcation
line refused the entry of the commission on January 13,
1948.
March 25, 1948—
The North 'Korean Democratic National United Front
proposed a joint conference of "political parties and
social organizations" in bctn halves to discuss unifi-




Ihe af croentioned joint conference opened in P'yor. ;yang
with the participation of 564 representatives cf 5c
southern and northern organizations. On April 30,
1948/ it issued a communique calling for the withdrawal
cf ail foreign troops and the creation of an "all-Korea
Political Council", a caretaker government, to conduct
general elections throughout the country to establish a
unified government.
May 10, 1S4 8
—
General elections were held under United Nations super-
vision in the southern areas to elect a National
Assembly, which was then formed on May 3 1, 1946.
June 12, 1 948--
The National Assembly passed a resolution calling for
general elections in the northern areas to elect dele-





Korea government was inaugurated ir.
September 9, 1948—
P'ycrgyang declared the founding of the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea.
June 28, 1949—
Ihe Democratic Front f
Pat her land was founded in
formation of an election
of South and North Korean
organizations to conduct
the peninsula for the
national legislature.
or the Unification of the
P'yongyang and called for the
committee of representatives
political parties and social
general elections throughout
establishment of a unified
June 7, -1950—
The Central Committee of the Democratic Front for the
Unification of the Fatherland proposed conducting
general elections throughout Korea between August 5 and
8 to establish a unified national legislature in Seoul
on August 15, 1S50. It also proposed a consultative
conference of representatives of all political parties
and social organizations in the South and in the- North
to make arrangements for the elections.
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June 1$, 19 50
—
The North Korean Supreme People's Assembly proposed a
merger of the North Korean legislature with the
National Assembly in the Soutn.
June 25, 1950--
The Korean War hostilities were initiated.
July 27, 1953—
The Korean Armistice Agreement was signed, bringing the
fighting to a ceasefire.
November 23, 1 953—
President Syngman Ehee of the Republic of Korea
proposed that a general election be held in the North
tc choose representatives to fill the seats reserved
for them in the EOK National Assembly.
April 27, 1954
—
The Geneva Conference opened fuilfilling the prevision
of the Armistice Agreement that a conference be
convened to seek a peaceful settlement of the Korean
issue.
June 15, 1954
The Geneva Conference broke up due to sharp disagree-
ments ever three major issues: the authority and compe-
tence of the United Nation on the Korean question; U.N.
supervised general elections proportionate to the
population of the whole of Korea; and the stationing of
D.N. forces in Korea until the creation of a unified,
independent and democratic Korea.
October 2, 1954--
The RCK National Assembly passed a resolution calling
for unification through U. N. -super vised general
elections in the northern areas to choose representa-
tives to the legislature.
October 30, 1954—
The Supreme People's Assembly of North Korea called for
a joint meeting of the South and North Korean legisla-
tures, or a joint conference of representatives of all
walks of life from both the South and the North, to
discuss South-Ncrth exchanges and unification.
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December 11/ 1954—
The U.N. General Assembly, to which the basic responsi-
bility for the Korean guestion returned after the
rupture of the Geneva Conference, reaffirmed the goal
cf a unified, independent and democratic Korea estab-
lished through peaceful means and urged North Korea to
accept this prircipie. This was the beginning of. a
long series of debates en the Korean guestion.
August 15, 1955—
In a liberation Day speech, Kim Il-sung proposed an
international cenference to guarantee peace in Korea, a
North-South agreement not to use military force, the
withdrawal cf foreign troops and a conference or dole-
gates from Seoul and P'yongyang to discuss peaceful
unification.
April 28,1955--
Ihe Third Party Congress of the North Korean Workers
Party called for joint struggles against "American impe-
rialism and other enemies of unification", the applica-
tion of "democratic principles" in the South, jereial
elections to establish a unified government and an
international agreement to secure the peace cz v crea
and a peaceful sclution cf tne Korean guestion.
September 10, 1957
—
The ROK National Assembly called for 'J. M . -supervised
general elections in the Nortn to unify the country and
Korean membership in the United Nations.
September 20, 1957
At the Supreme People's Assembly, Kim Il-sung proposed
the withdrawal cf ali foreign troops from Korean soil,
the reduction cf armed forces in noth the South and the
North to 100,000 each, free travel and postal and
cultural exchanges between tne South and tne North, an
international conference for peaceful adjustment cf the
Korean question and general elections throughout the
ccuntry to achieve unification.
August m, 1960--
In a liberation Day address, Kim Il-sung proposed a
confederation of the South and the North as an interim
step toward all Korea general elections, the creation
of a North-South Economic Committee in case the confed-
eration proposal was not accepted, cultural, athletic,
ether forms of exchanges, the withdrawal of foreign
trocps and North-South force reductions, and a
P'anmunjom conference between Seoul and P'yongyang
representatives to discuss these proposals.
155
August 27, 1960--
Priire Minister Chang Myon of the F.OK called fcr 'J.N.
supervised general elections to unify the country.
November 2, 1960
—
The ECK National Assemciy asked that U.N. supervised
elections proportionate to population be hell
throughout the peninsula under procedures prescribed by
the ROK Constitution.
June 24, 1 S61
—
EOK Foreign Minister Kim Hong-il declared that Korea:.
unification must be sought through peaceful z^^t.z
alone.
November 15, 1961—
Park Chung Hee issued a joint communique in Washington
with President Kennedy calling for peaceful unification
en the principles reaffirmed oy the 'J.N. General
Assembly.
October 23, 1962—
At the Supreme People's Assembly in Pyongyang, Ki-
ll-sung repeated a proposal for North-South confedera-
tions, joint anti- American struggles and mutual reduc-
tions in military forces.
January 24, 1963—
Sports delegates from the South and North met in
Iausanne, Switzerland, to discuss the formation of a
unified Korean team to take part in the 19 54 Tokyo
Clympics. The third meeting, held in Hong Kong or. July
24, 1963 ended in failure.
December 10, 1963--
In P'yonjyang, a joint meeting of representatives of
the Supreme People's Assembly, the Democratic Front for
the Unification of the Fatherland and the Committee for
the Peaceful Unification proposed a North-South non
aggression pact; postal and telecommunications
exchanges; the authorization of travel between the
South and the North by journalists, artists, scholars,
and tourists; a standing joint committee at P'anmunjom
to deal with economic and other forms of exchanges; and
a conference between representatives from Seoul and
P'yongyang to discuss various concerns of the entire
people. It repeated the demand for the withdrawal of







Chung Hee opposed any unification
than U.N. supervised free general
the South and the North.
September 8, 1966
—
North Korean Vice-Premier Kim K^ang-sop demanded the
nullification of the U.N. resolutions or. the Korean
question and a joint conference of South and North
Korean political parties to discuss ways to unify the
ccuntry free of outside intervention.
Cctoter 17, 1966—
The EOK Foreign ministry issued a unification vhi re-
paper upholding the principle of U.N supervised
all-Korea general elections proportionate to indigenous
pop ula tion.
March 1, 1963--
Ihe ROK National Unification Board was established
develop and coordinate unification efforts.
to
August 15, 1970—
President Park in a Liberation Day address called for
peaceful competition in development, construction, and
creativity between the South and North.
August 12, 1971
—
Er Choi Doo-sun, President of the Republic of Korea Ped
Cross, proposed to the North Korean Ped Cross that the
Bed Cross societies in the two sides of Korea jointly
initiate a cairpaijn to search for the families
dispersed throughout the South and North.
August 14, 1971—
The North Korean Red Cross announced Its acceptance in
principle of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross
proposal for the family search campaign.
September 20, 1971—
first preliminary meeting of the South-North Red Cress
conference opened at P'anmunjom.
Hay 2, 1972—
Eresident Park sent Lee Hu-rak,
Central Intelligence Agency, to
secret emissary to meet with Kim Il-sung
to create dialogue between the two sides.
then
P'





P'yongyang secretly sent Park Sorg-chui to Seoul in
return for Lee Ku-rak'e visit.
July 4, 1 972
—
Seoul and P'yongyang announced the South-North
Communique , in which the two sides vowed to suspend
slandering and defaming each other and promote
exchanges. They also agreed to create a South-North
Coordinating Committee and open a direct
Seoul-P 'yongyang telephone line.
August 11, 1972
—
The preliminary meeting of the South-North Red Cross
conference came to an end.
August 22, 1972
Seoul and P'yongyang issued statements guaranteeing the
personal safety of those who travel across the truce
line to take part in full-dress Red Cross meetings to
re held in Seoul and P'yongyang alternately.
August 2S, 1972--
The first full-dress meeting of the North-South Eed
Cross Conference opened in P'yongyang.
September 12, 19 72
—
The second meeting of the Red Cross Conference opened
in Seoul.
October 12, 1972—
The first meeting of the co-chairmen of the South-North
Coordinating Committee opened at P'anmunjom.
November 2, 1972—
The second co-chairmen's meeting of the South-North
Coordinating Committee opened in P'yongyang and adopted
the Agreed Minute on the Formation and Operation of the
South-North Coordinating Committee, and an agreement on




The South-North Coordinating Committee (SNCC) was
formally inaugurated and held its first meeting in
Seoul.
March 10, 1973—




F'ycngyang reopened, for a while, propaganda broadcasts
across the truce line, violating the propaganda suspen-
sion agreement.
June 23, 1 973--
Eresident Park declared the Special Foreign Policy for
Peace and Unification, in which he called for peaceful
coexistence between the North and the South pending
national unification, and disclosed his intentions no J.
tc cppcse P'yongyang's entry into the United Nations 1.5




P'ycngyang rejected any simultaneous entry into the
United Nations by North and South Korea.
July 10, 1973—
The seventh meeting of the South-North Red Cross
Conference opened in P'yongyang; the North Korean F.ed
Cross rejected the ROK Eed Cross proposal that the two
sides exchange groups of visitors to ancestral graves
in the South and North. No date was set for the next
meeting.
August 26, 1973--
Kim Young-joo, r'yongyang-side co-chairman of the SNCC,
arncunced Pyongyang's boycott of the North-South
dialogue.
August 2S, 1973—
le Hu-rak, Seoul co-chairman of the SNCC denounced
P'yongyang* s unilateral suspension of the dialogue, and
demanded its immediate resumption.
Novemfcer 16, 1973—
In a message delivered to the South-side of the SNCC,
F'ycngyang demanded as preconditions to a resuaei
dialogue, repeal of the Special Foreign Policy for
Eeace and unification and release of all Communist
prisoners.
December 13, 1 973
—
lee Bcm-sok, chief delegate of the ROK Red Cross,
called for an early resumption of the South-North Sed




President Park proposed, in a New Year press confer-





In a editorial of the Rodong Shinmun, P'ycngyang
rejected President Park's offer of a non-aggression
agreement
May 29, 1974—
The delegates ireeting of tne South-North Red Cross
Conference wound up seven rounds of contacts, and
agreed to hold working level meetings of the Eel Cress
talks.
July 1C, 1S74--
Ihe first working level meeting of the South-Fcrth Zed
Cross Conference was held.
August 15, 1974--
President park announced three basic principles :o.
peaceful unification: the conclusion cf a ncn-
aggression agreement, continuation of dialogic and
institution of Korth-South exchanges and cooperation,




lhe Seoul side of the SNCC protested Pyongyang's
resumption of propaganda broadcasts.
May 29, 1975—
lhe Pyongyang side notified Seoul of its decision to




meeting of the SNCC originally set for day 30, 1S75.
July 4, 197 5—
President Park, in a statement marking the third anni-
versary of the South-North Communique, urged Pyongyang
to stop war preparations and resume suspended dialogue.
March 31, 1976
—
The ROK Red Cross proposed a meeting between the chief
delegates of the two sides to discuss the deadlocked
Bed Cress talks.
April 7, 1976—








January 12, 19 77
—
President Park told a news conference that he would not
oppose the withdrawal of O.S. ground troops provided a
non aggression pact be concluded between North and
South Korea. He also offered food aid to tr.e Nortii in
view of crop failures there.
January 26, 1977
Chang Key-young, acting Seoul-side co-chair mar of the
SNCC, proposed a discussion of arrangements foe
concluding a nonagression agreement.
February 1, 1977
P'yongyang rejected the proposal for debate on tr.e idea
of a ncn- aggression aggreemert.
February 11, 1977—
At .the 21st Red Cross working level meeting the South
suggested that if P'yongyang coald not agree to the
holding of the eighth full-dress meeting in Seoul, it
be held in P'yongyang. The North rejected the offer.
July 22, 19 77--
Cr. Min Kwan-shik, Seoul's acting co-chair rear, cfthe
SNCC, denounced Pyongyang's establishment of a 23 j
irile economic sea zone .
August 1 , 1 977—
Culture and Information Minister Kim Seong-jin of the
BCK, denounced P'yongyang's establishment cf an
"economic sea zcr.e" and "military sea boundary lines".
March 19, 1978
—
P'yongyang unilaterally postponed the 26th working
level Bed Cross talks that were to take place March 20.
June 23, 1978
—
President Park proposed the creation of a consultative
tody for the promotion of South-North economic coopera-
tion.
August 12, 1978--
Eresident of the ECK Red Cross, Lee Ho, proposed to his




President Park, in a New Year press conference, called
en North Korea to resume tne stalemate! South-liorth
talks between responsible autnorities "at any place, at
anytime, and at any level" without preconditions to
discuss all problems pending between the two sides in
order to prevent a war and achieve unification.
February 17, 1 979--
In the first North-South contact in over a year, Er.
Min Kwan-shik, fCK acting co-chairman of tne SNCC, re-
in P'ar.munjom with North Korean representatives cl tne
Democratic Front for the unification of the Fathfcziai:*
in an attempt to open the way for the resumption c: the
long stalled dialogue between the two halves of tne
peninsula .
February 24, 1 979
—
Sports officials from the South and the North met at
F' anmunjom to discuss the organization of a single
Korean team to compete in the 35th World Tanle tennis
Championships to open in P'yongyang on April 25, 1979.
The talks ruptured at the fourth meeting on March 12,
1979. Subsequently, North Korea refused the entry of
the South Korean team for participation in tne tourna-
ment.
March 7, 1 9 79--
Dr. Min Kwan-shik met with the North Koreans tor the
second time in P'anmunjcm. Dr. Min stated that the
Democratic Front for the Unification of the Fatherland
was not an acceptable negotiating partner and called
for the normalization of the SNCC.
March 14, 1979—
Dr. Min met with the North Koreans for the third time
in P'anmunjom. He proposed that a meeting of working-
level officials representing the authorities cf both
sides be held in P'anmunjcm on March 28.
March 28, 1979—
Eepresenting the government of the ROK, a delegation of
officials led by Dong Hoon, Vice-Minister of national
Unification, went to P'anmunjom for a working level
meeting but no North Korean delegation showed up.
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July 1, 197 9—
President Park and President Carter proposed the
convening of a "meeting of official representatives cf
South and North Korea and the United States" tc seek
means to promote dialogue and reduce tension in this
part of the world.
July 1C, 1979—
President Park called on North Korea to reopen the
South-North Red Cross talks and to accept the crier of
the ECK to either held talks between responsible
authorities of the two sides or to hold tripartite
talks including the United States.
December 21, 1979—
President Choi Kyu Ha, in his innaugural address,
called on North Korea to respond to any of the previous
EOK proposals tc resume dialogue.
January 11, 1980
—
The Korean Amateur Sports Association called en its
North Korean counterpart to discuss South- north
athletic exchanges and joint participation in interna-
tional sports events.
January 12, 1980
Premier Li Jong-ok of North Korea sent a letter to
Prime Minister Shin Hyon-hwack saying he would like tc
meet him in Secul, P'ycngyang or a third cou.'.try.
Ncrth Korean Vice-President Kim II sent 11 cti.er
letters to SOK leaders calling for a South-North
conference on the unification issue.
January 24, 1980—
Priire Minister Shin proposed to Premier Li oi North
Korea the holding of prepatory meetings of working-
level representatives from each side to arrange a prime
ministers conference.
February 6, 1980—
The first meeting of the working-level delegates to
prepare for the meeting of the prime ministers uas held
at P' anmun jom.
February 7, 1980—
Two direct telephone lines were opened between Seoul
and P'yongyang for the use of the working-level delega-




The 10th meeting of the working-level representatives
was held but the chief north Korean delegate was absent
for reasons of health.
September 4, 1 980
—
North Korea resumed propaganda broadcasts across the
EMZ in violation of the July 4, 1972 Joint Communique.
September 12, 1930--
Fresident Lee He of the FOK fied Cross ur 3 ed the Keith
Korean Eed Cross to resume the plenary session cf the
North-South Eed Cross.
September 24, 1 930
—
Two days before the scheduled 11th meeting cf the
working-level representatives to prepare for the Prime
Minister's talks, North Korea unilaterally declared the
suspension of wcrking level contacts.
October 3, 1980--
Fresident CHun Coo Hwan urged North Korea to held a
Prime Ministers conference.
Cctoter 10, 1980—
At the Sixth Ccngress cf the Nortn Korean Worker's
Party, Kim Il-sung ^resented an elaborate proposal to
form a Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryc tut
refused to discuss the idea with the South Korean
authorities
.
January 12, 1981 —
In an attempt at a breakthrough in tne deadlocked
dialogue, President Chun proposed in the New Year
policy Statement and exchange of visits by the top
leaders of the South and the north "without any condi-
tion attached and free of any obligation".
January 19, 1981 —
Kim 11, chairman of the North Korean Committee for the
Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland, issued a state-
ment rejecting the January 12 proposal.
June 5, 1981—
In an address at the inauguration of the Advisory
Council on Peaceful Unification Policy, President Chun
proposed a summit meeting with Kim Il-sung, leaving the




North Korea's Rodong, Shinmun (Worker's Daily)
broadcasts rejected the June 5 proposal.





president cf the Korean Amateur Sports
proposed the formation of unified
teams to participate in international
athletic events.
July 1, 19 8 1—
Kim Il-sung rejected
sals made by the ROK.




statement by North Korea's political parties
and social organizations proposed that the unification
guesticn be discussed with their South Korean ccunter-
:arts at Ccnference
Unification. The present
leaders were to fce excluded fro
for the Acceleration of
ROK government and political
the conference.
August 12, 198 1—
Kim Yong-shik, president of the ROK
declared his willingness to meet
counterpart in an effort to resume





separated by the division of the country.
August 15, 1981--
Fresident Chun, in a Liberation Day speech, called on
F'ycngyang to act affiratively on nis proposals fcr an
exchange of visits and a summit between the top leaders
of the South and the North.
August 2C, 1981--
Checn Kwan-wu, char i man of the





obstructionist manueverinj and respond
to the spirit of President Chun's two
proposals for a dialogue". He also offered to arrange a
new dialogue.
September 4, 1 981
—
The ROK Ministry of National Defense issued a statement
urging North Korea to end the loudspeaker broadcasts
against the ROK.
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November 16, 198 1
—
BCK Minister ox Culture and Information Lee Kwang-pyo
proposed archeolcgical exchanges with North Korea as an
initial step toward broader cultural contacts between
the two halves of the country.
January 22, 1932—
In the New Year Policy Statement, President Chun put
forward a formula for national reconciliation leading
to democratic unification and invited P'yorgyang to
join in a Consultative Conference for National




ECK Minister of National Qnificaion Sohn Jae-shik
proposed 20 pilct projects for South-North exchange and
cooperation to achieve national reconciliation prelimi-
nary to substantive progress toward unification.
February 10, 1982
Kim 11, chairman of the North Korean Committee for the
Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland, issued a state-
ment rejecting the 20 pilot projects and calling for a
unification conference of 100 representatives cf South
and North Korean political parties and social organiza-
tions, 50 from each side, but excluding most present
BCK political leaders.
February 25, 1982
Unification Minister Sohn proposed high-level
inter-Korean talks to discuss "not only President Chun's
unification for aula but also the question of a unifica-
tion conference raised by North Korea.
March 26, 1982—




U.S Vice President Bush visited South Korea. He
expressed strong support for the latest South Korean
unification foriula.
May 5, 1S82—
Ihe Minister of National Unification, Son Chae-sik
proposed that North-South economic exchanges be
actively promoted.
1b6
June 5, 19 8 2—
A Scuth Korean Presidential Council of 3,825 members
ur 3 ed that President Chun's 16 month old unification
proposal he adopted. They also called for the North to
accept the "20 pilot projects".
June 9, 1982—
RCK Unification Minister Son in a speech at Xcungnam
University said that prospects for unification would
improve with the death of Kim II sung. He also stated
that the ROK's economic development would he a drivirj
force for unification.
August 12, 1982--
The Korean National Red Cross in a statement urged the
resumption of North-South talKS on unification. They
advocated reopening the Seoul-Pyongyan^ telephone line
and the function of the liason offices at Panmunjcn be
restored.
August 25, 1982--
Ihe Korea Unification bank was opened in Seoul by the
government and businessmen who came from the North. It
is expected to play a leading role in economic
exchanges with the North when Korea is unified.
October 4, 1982
—
The 2nd International Workshop on Korean Unification
opened in Seoul.
Cctoter 20, 1982—
The Foreign Ministry- announced that it would try to
create an international climate that would be conducive
to the admittance of the RCK into the United Nations.
It also announced that it would pursue attempts to gain
diplomatic cross-recognition of the North and the Soutn
by the United States, Japan, the USSR, and China.
October 27, 1982—
FCK Prime Minister Kim Sang-hyop, in an address to the
ECK Red Cross, urged the North to come to the confer-
ence table with the South.
December 1, 1982—
The International Liason Committee for the Independent
and Peaceful Unification of Korea made public a state-
ment in Pyongyang that blamed the U.S. and the United
Nations for the reunification stalemate.
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December 7, 1S8 2
—
ECK President Chun Doo-hwan in a speech before tae
Advisory Council on Peaceful Unification Policy charged
North Korea with ignoring the proposals made fcy the
South.
January 8, 1983--
The Voice of the Revolutionary Party for Reunification
stated that the presence of U. S. troops in the South is
the major block to reunification. They also charged
the ECK with war preparations.
January 19, 1983—
ECK President Chun Dco-hwan stated that the Korean
guesticn should be settled through direct negotiation
between the North and the South without external influ-
ence and in accordance with the principles of self
determiniat ion. He also called once again for a summit
meeting between the North ana the South, an arms reduc-




FCK Unification Minister Son Chae-sik called for
renewed talks between the North and the South. He also
proposed that the South and the North hold at an early
date a conference of representatives of the top leaders
of the North and the South Korean governments and
political leaders. He further proposed that a




The NODONG SINIiON denounced the efforts of the South to
gain sole entry into the United Nations and its efforts




Minister of Foreign Affairs Yi Pom-sik announced tiiat
the prospects fcr cross recognition of the North and
the South by the major powers are not bright.
June 24, 1 9 63--
The NCDONG SINMUN reiterated the North's policy
unification and once again outlined the "f.
policy" for unification as proposed by Kim Il-sung
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July a, 1983—
Win Kwan-sik, the acting head of the South North
Coordinating Committee , on the 11th anniversary of the
July 4 Communique called for renewed talks between the
North and the South.
July 8, 19 8 3
—
Minister of Foreign Affairs li ?om-sik announced that
the ECK will =eek U.N. aid in order to resume
North-South dialogue on the issue of separated fami-
lies.
July 29, 19 83
—
Dx Kim Kyong-won, ROK ambassador of the U.N. observa-
tion mission, called on the North to resume talks or.
the unification issue.
August 15, 1983--
NODCNG SINaua reports that the North is willing to ccme
tc Fed Cross talks with the South on the issue ox sepa-
rated families only upon the withdrawal of U.S. forces
from the South.
August 20, 1983--
NODCNG SINMUN article blames the South for the failure
cf the Red Cross talks in the early 1970*5 and the
subsequent lack cf talks since that time.
October 8, 1983
—
North Korea proposes three-way talks with the U.S. and
the South on the unification issue.
January 10, 1984
—
An editorial in the Korea Times questions the latest
North Korean peace proposal. The editorial states that
the South is leery of the proposal and questions the
sincerity of the North since the October 9, 1983
proposal was given one day before the Rangoon tcrrbing
incident.
January 10, 1984—
North Korea restated its proposal for three-way talks





Unification Minister Son Chae-sik replies to the North
Korean call for three- way talks. His reply questions
the sincerity cf the North, reiterated the South's
proposal for a summit meeting, and gave support to the
U.S. rejection cf the North Korean proposal due tc the
Bangocn bombing.
January 11, 1984—
The United States proposed that four way talks be held
on the issue of Korean unification. The particif ant
~
would be the ROK, North Korea, the U.S., and the FEC.
Sources: Unif
i
cat io n Endeavors bv the £e2uriic of
Ko££§r (Seoul: Korea Overseas Information Service,
1982), and Foreign Broadcast Information Service, ra ll y
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